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For the past several years a debate has been occurring about reason for the 
reduction of crime in New York City under the leadership of Mayor Giuliani and 
Police Commissioner Bill Bratton.  Some claim that the principles of Broken 
Windows Theory worked to reduce crime.  Others claim that the reduction had 
little to do with Broken Windows Theory and more to do with increased police, 
aggressive patrol tactics and abuses of the public by police.  This research was 
conducted into an initiative by the Vancouver Police to reassign sixty police 
officers to the Downtown Eastside. This initiative, Citywide Enforcement Team 
was put in place to reduce disorder in the DTES.  This research study utilized 
observational methods combined with quantitative and qualitative analysis to 
conclude that the introduction of the CET into the DTES impacted positively on 
the level of disorder and crime in that community.  
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C h a p t e r  1  
INTRODUCTION 
Do police matter?  Can policing have an impact on crime and 
disorder in a community?  Most police officers certainly believe that 
their efforts have a worthwhile impact: why would one sacrifice so 
much for nothing?  One could argue that community impact is not the 
chief motivator for all officers, and that some seek only such rewards 
as in other occupations: remuneration, holiday packages, sick time and 
a good pension — yet the bulk of police officers are willing to sacrifice 
hours away from family, odd working hours, and sometimes, ultimately, 
their lives, because they truly believe that they make a difference in the 
safety and security of a community.  
 
When one considers the vast body of academic research on the 
police and their impact on crime and disorder, an unclear picture 
emerges.  The question of whether police matter is very important.  
Police operating budgets consistently cost a large portion of the 
community's tax money: does policing give value for this money?  Or 
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could it be better spent on other expenditures that might attack the root 
causes of crime? 
 
This paper will examine if the police — in particular the 
Vancouver Police, working in partnership with the community — can 
make a difference to the level of disorder in Vancouver's Downtown 
Eastside (DTES).  In chapter two we will consider relevant academic 
contributions to the question of police effectiveness, and in particular 
Rational Choice Theories, Situational Crime Prevention and Broken 
Windows Theory.  Then in chapter three we will examine the current 
state of the DTES, including a discussion of its history, its current 
residents and the local police.  Following in chapter four will be a 
description of the methodology that was used to conduct research on 
the impact of the Vancouver Police Citywide Enforcement Team (CET), 
along with its rationale.   Finally in chapter five we will draw some 
conclusions as to why the police do matter.  In addition in chapter five 
we will consider how this research has added to the current debate 
between Harcourt, who is dismissive of broken windows theory, and 
Kelling, who is a proponent of broken windows theory. 
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The research conducted in this paper is testing the Broken 
Windows hypothesis and in particular if the addition of foot patrol police 
officers into a neighborhood in crisis can have an impact on crime and 
disorder.  This research is also testing the hypothesis of opportunity 
theorist in that do the police matter. Can police minimize the 
opportunity to commit crime? Specifically the theory of capable 
guardians and motivated rational offenders will be tested.  With the 
introduction of the CET into the DTES and the creation of more 
capable caregivers into the area.  Further do rational thinking criminals 
emerge and decide to change their pattern of offending or is the police 
presence simply going to increase arrests.  
In order to conduct independent research five university 
students agreed to make field observations of the DTES prior to the 
implementation of the CET and then once again after sixty-three days 
of their operations.  These students quantitative recording and their 
qualitative observations provides evidence that the implementation of 
the CET did have impact on the level of public disorder and crime in 
the area.  Further the CET had considerable impact on the students 
perception of their personal safety in the area while conducting 
observations.   
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Additionally an analysis will be conducted of other sources of 
research conducted on the DTES while the CET was put in place.  This 
will specifically include the independent research conducted by Pollara 
of the DTES and Vancouver residents perceptions of the DTES, and 
the crime analysis conducted by the CET Criminal Intelligence Section. 
The paper will conclude that irrespective of the current debates 
between Harcourt and Kelling about the causes of the reduction for 
crime in New York City, the DTES did have a reduction in crime 
because of the CET.  Moreover that this study has replicated that when 
police are introduced into an area, public disorder and crime will 
reduce.  Further if one agrees with Harcourt position that in New York 
these reductions came about because of police excesses then in 
Vancouver the same result came about without any such excesses.  
These differences include less of a focus by CET on zero tolerance 
and arrests and more of focus on being a sheer presence and the 
threat of arrest or prosecution.  These different approaches with similar 
results compels this author to reject Harcourt’s theory that increased 
police surveillance coupled with aggressive stops and frisks was the 
true cause of the crime reduction in New York City.  In Vancouver’s 
DTES the police did not use aggressive stop and search practices as 
these are prohibited under the Charter of Rights and Freedoms.  
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People were checked, searched when the CET found them in a 
position that the CET could legally do these stops and searches.  One 
must concede that there was the report conducted by Human Rights 
Watch, which claimed excesses by the CET however these have been 
found to be based on hearsay and lacking in fact.  The officers 
assigned to CET are professionals who are well aware of the 
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C h a p t e r  T w o -  A c a d e m i c  D e b a t e s  a n d  C r i m e  a n d  
D i s o r d e r  
 
When discussing the issue of police effectiveness, and how 
policing affects the level of disorder in a community, some important 
theories to consider include Situational Crime Prevention Theory, 
Rational Choice Theory, and Routine Activity Theory.  These theories 
will be considered only briefly, as foundations for the primary theory 
being analyzed, Broken Windows Theory.  I will examine Broken 
Windows Theory in greater detail because it follows the same vein as 
Situational Crime Prevention, and is directly credited with some police 
agencies' successes in dealing with public disorder and crime (G. 
Kelling & Coles, 1996:19).  Situational Crime Prevention itself is a 
synthesis of many other theories (Brunet, 2002:70), the inclusion of any 
of which could enrich this discussion; however, given the breadth of 
this paper I must limit theoretical discussion to those theories that 
appear on point.   
 
There are many different crimes, and academics have provided 
many different explanations as to why crimes occur.  Any first-year 
criminology student becomes acutely aware of the frustration of 
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learning and accepting one theory of the causes of crime, only shortly 
thereafter to learn a new, conflicting, but equally compelling theory.    
Situational Crime theory is one of the theories that has emerged since 
the 1970’s with a re-focus on the crimes rather than the offenders.  
Situational crime prevention theorist believe that the opportunity to 
commit crime and why that opportunity exists is as important if not 
more important that the root cause of why an offender commits the 
crime.  For these ‘opportunity theorists” the prevention of crime is about 
target hardening and reducing rewards, increasing risks and not 
focusing on the offender.  Police officers assigned to surveillance 
teams can describe the process of watching known criminals for only a 
few moments and being able to determine the person being watched is 
either in “crime mode” or not. Countless times, criminals who are in 
"crime mode” make rational decisions about when and where to 
commit a crime.  Even the most drug-addicted addict, in search of a 
source of money to buy drugs for a much-needed fix, make decisions 
about which cars to break into, where to break into the cars, and what 
to take from them.  Further, “Criminological theory has long seemed 
irrelevant to those who have to deal with offenders in the real world.  
This irrelevance stems partly from attributing the causes of crime to 
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distant factors, such as child rearing practices, genetic makeup, and 
psychological or social processes” (Felson & Clarke, 1998:1). 
 
As one examines the causes crime and disorder in the DTES of 
Vancouver, there are two routes of enquiry one can take.  One is to 
consider that the causes of crime and disorder are associated to the 
root causes of criminality, such as poverty, drug addiction, child abuse, 
et cetera.  The other avenue of discovery is to attempt to understand 
the cause of crime and disorder within the context of the DTES and to 
examine why the DTES provides more opportunity for crime and 
disorder than other areas of the city.  The residents of the DTES may 
be very compassionate for the drug addicts in their community, yet 
notwithstanding this they also want the crime and disorder to end.  If 
the police, government, and social service providers were to accept the 
principles of Situational Crime Prevention and Broken Windows 
Theory, the reduction in crime associated with such a focused effort 
could bring enough results that some current financial resources may 
be funneled off to support other valued ventures that attack root 
causes.  For this reason, this paper will examine these “opportunity 
theories” as opposed to “root causes.” 
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The implementation of the CET is seen to be a crime and 
disorder prevention measure.  The purpose of the redeploying officers 
to foot patrol in the DTES is to increase the presence of the police in 
the DTES.  Using the rational choice theorist perspectives the 
Vancouver Police are attempting to increase the capable guardians in 
the area while maximizing the risk of drug traffickers and open-air drug 
users getting caught.  Ultimately the thinking criminal from Surrey (a 
Vancouver suburb connected to downtown by rapid transit), who 
usually steals, pawns and uses in the DTES, will decide that the 
rational decision is to stay out in Surrey, where there are fewer police 
and consequently less likelihood of being arrested. 
 
Let us now consider the various theories.  
 
Rational Choice Theory and Routine Activity Theory 
 
Rooted in the classic theorists of Cesare Beccaria and Jeremy 
Bentham is the belief that the human being is a rational actor. This 
means that the human being, in making decisions, does an end/means 
calculation in order to maximize pleasure and minimize pain (Keel, 
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1997:Web Page).  Rational Choice Theory derives from the failure of 
rehabilitative technologies and the increase of crime during the 1970s 
and 1980s (Keel, 1997: Web Page).  This work has since been built 
upon, and many academics believe that criminals conduct a cost-
benefit analysis when selecting legal or illegal behaviours (Bill 
McCarthy, 2002:422). 
 
Routine Activity Theory was first outlined by Felson and Cohen 
in 1979 and further developed by Felson and Eck in 1986.  The 
theories central hypothesis is that, “the probability that a violation will 
occur at any specific time and place might be taken as a convergence 
of likely offenders and suitable targets in the absence of capable 
guardians” (Bottoms & Wiles, 1997:320). 
 
Wang discusses both Rational Choice Theory and Routine 
Activity Theory in his study, "Bank Robberies by an Asian Gang" in a 
major Southern city of the United States: 
 
      Crime results from the decision making process in which a 
potential offender weighs the possible costs and benefits of 
committing a crime.  The decision or choice to commit a crime 
will be made after evaluating available information with regard 
to the risk of being caught, possible punishment, and the need 
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for criminal gain.  If the economic benefit is not worthwhile or 
the chance of getting caught is too great, the individual may 
decide not to commit the crime (Wang, 2002:557). 
 
Wang concluded from his research that the presence of motivated 
offenders, combined with suitable targets and lack of capable 
guardians, resulted in armed robberies of banks.   
 
In review, Rational Choice Theory and Routine Activity Theory 
contend that crime is linked to the social/environmental context in 
which it takes place.  The theories focus on the offender, the victim and 
the caretakers.  Such theories are useful for my examination of the 
DTES because part of my theory contends that the DTES has lacked 
capable caretakers in the police (private or public), and that the 
communities of Chinatown, Gastown and Strathcona provide ample 
and adequate targets for these motivated offenders.  Further, the sheer 
number of free services provided to people in the DTES, the density of 
nearby pawnshops, and the prolific number of drug traffickers combine 
to make the DTES a very attractive place for motivated offenders — 
even those from other communities.  This situation is also exacerbated 
by a SkyTrain Transit system, which despite recent improvements does 
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not have an adequate system in place to check fare beaters 
(DesChamps, Brantingham, & Brantingham, 1994:143). 
 
Sergeant Tony Zannatta of the Vancouver Police described the 
DTES in one of the early pre-CET planning meetings as the “one-stop 
shop” for Lower Mainland criminals (Zannatta, 2003: personal 
interview).  A cocaine addict can commit a residential break and enter 
in Surrey, steal 50 music CD’s, hop on the SkyTrain with his bag of 
loot, take the train for free to Vancouver, walk three blocks to the 
DTES, pawn the CD’s for ten dollars each, purchase drugs easily and 
use them openly on the street, stop and get a free meal if he so 
chooses, and then take a free SkyTrain back out to Surrey.  The DTES 
has become for criminals the equivalent of the modern day shopping 
mall, with all the required amenities for a family’s weekly shopping 
expedition.  The City of Vancouver — and in particular the Vancouver 
Police, by implementing the CET — must make this “one-stop shop” 
less attractive.  Moreover, the history of the DTES, its lack of 
resources, a series of misguided political decisions, and the subculture 
of tolerance that exists in the DTES have encouraged people to 
participate in activities that in other areas of the city would result in 
formal sanctions from the police. 
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According to Taylor, Rational Choice Theory was first applied 
when Derek Cornish and Ron Clarke introduced it in 1986.  In their 
book, The Reasoning Criminal, the authors state that the criminal 
commits a crime because the opportunity to do so presents itself 
(Taylor, 1997:293).  The theory postulates that crime, and the choice to 
commit crime, are based on rational thought.  Further, the Rational 
Choice theorist is less concerned with what causes the criminality of 
individuals or in large parts of neighborhoods, than with the specific 
opportunities and evaluations made by criminals in seeking to commit a 
crime (Taylor, 1997:294).  The “root causes” of crime are not 
considered: just the mechanics of an individual criminal act.  The value 
in this type of theory is its applicability for people tasked with reducing 
crime and disorder — that is, not to negate root causes of crime, but 
simply to reduce the ability of those who commit crime. 
 
Rational Choice Theory has been used to explain many types of 
crime.  We shall now consider two recent studies, which have parallel 
applications to the DTES.  McCarthy and Hagan (2001) found in their 
study of homeless youth that, on average, youth who sold drugs made 
about 101 dollars per day compared to the average legal wage of 37 
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dollars.  They concluded that some youth are making a rational choice 
to be involved in drug trafficking to earn more income than if they had 
legitimate employment (Bill McCarthy, 2002:428; B. McCarthy & 
Hagan, 2001)).  “Similarly, Washington, DC drug sellers earned 
monthly incomes that were more than double the median amount 
earned in legal jobs” (Bill McCarthy, 2002; Reuter P, 1990).  These 
studies show that, at least in the case of some drug traffickers, some 
individuals are making rational choices to earn more income than the 
average person by resorting to crime. 
 
Several criticisms of Rational Choice Theory and Routine 
Activity Theory exist; I will provide two that are particularly recent and 
relevant to the DTES studies.  First, in using Rational Choice Theory to 
examine the impact of the CET in the DTES, one must consider if drug-
addicted people are in fact capable of rational thought.  One study of 
people under the influence of alcohol concluded that Rational Choice 
Theory may be in fact unable to explain the behaviour of people under 
the influence of alcohol because they are unable to make rational 
choices (Exum, 2002:959).   
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Other critics claim that, “[W]hat is common to both the routine 
activities and the rational choice theories is an inattention, in both the 
theoretical and empirical literature, to the possibility that persons may 
differ with respect to their initial propensity to offend (Nagin & 
Paternoster, 1993)  
 
Situational Crime Prevention 
 
Situational Crime Prevention is a theory which builds upon the 
concepts of Rational Choice Theory and Routine Activity Theory.  It 
does not reject the root cause theories; however, it sets them aside to 
concentrate on minimizing crime by reducing the opportunity for 
offenders to commit crime.  The theory is concerned not with why the 
offender commits the crime, but with how the offender commits the 
crime — and more importantly, with how to minimize the attractiveness 
of the particular target.  In fact opportunity theorists believe,   
 
[S]ince crime opportunities are a necessary condition for a 
crime to occur, this makes them causes in a strong sense 
of the word.  At the same time, many people from uncaring 
or broken homes have never committed crimes, and many 
people from good families in comfortable circumstances 
have become active offenders (Felson & Clarke, 1998: 1). 
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Situational Crime Prevention has been used to examine many 
types of crime to provide policy makers, police, and the public with 
information to try to combat the problem.  Situational Crime Prevention 
theorists believe that there are ten principles of crime opportunity 
theory.  Let us consider each one, and provide some relevant 
examples to the debate. 
 
Opportunity plays a role in causing all crime. 
 
Studies have shown that the manner in which licensed premises 
are designed or operated can have an impact on pub violence.  Ross 
Homel and Jeff Clark conducted a study of licensed premises in 
Sydney, Australia in the winter of 1991, and concluded that some, in 
their policies and the manner in which staff handled situations, created 
the opportunity for violence, while others did not.  The offender 
received cues from the bar's own management as to what kinds of 
behaviour would be accepted.  They recommended better trained 
bouncers, and bar staff who focused on responsible serving practices 
(Homel & Clark, 1994: 16). 
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Twenty-five percent of all licensed premises in the City of 
Vancouver are located in the DTES (Prox, 2003a: Appendix).  Such a 
high density of liquor establishments alone would indicate, based on 
the Homel and Clark study, that even without the open drug markets 
the DTES may be susceptible to proportionately more public disorder 
than other areas of the city.  The larger percentage of licensed 
premises provides for more opportunities for liquor establishments that 
run their business in ways that are conducive to violence and disorder.   
 
 Crime opportunities are highly specific. 
 
Certain types of crime have certain types of offenders.  
Offenders who perform residential burglaries, for instance, may not 
necessarily commit commercial break and enters.  Further, this 
distinction is crucial in our discussion of CET and the DTES, because 
the police categorize its drug traffickers in one of two ways: either as 
“For profit traffickers” or as “User traffickers”.  The “For profit trafficker” 
does not use drugs, and is simply in the area with the intent to earn an 
income selling them.  Crime reduction strategies for this type of 
offender will be different than for a “User trafficker,” who typically 
middles deals, acts as a go-between, or actively sells narcotics but 
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expects remuneration only in kind.  Once they have sold enough 
narcotics to fix their needs for the day, they will take their drugs and go 
use.  The police must treat these two types of offenders differently.  
The user is motivated by a drug addiction, while the “For profit trafficker 
is motivated by money.    
 
Crime opportunities are concentrated in time and space. 
 
“Dramatic differences are found from one address to another, 
even in high crime areas.  Crime shifts greatly by hour of the day and 
by day of the week, reflecting the opportunity to carry out crime” 
(Felson & Clarke, 1998: v).  Once again the DTES has the same 
patterns.  The highest call load for police is the few days after the social 
assistance checks are issued.  There have been increases in 
robberies, drug overdoses and the area takes on a general “Mardi 
Gras” atmosphere.   
 
 
Crime opportunities depend on everyday movement of activity. 
“Offenders and their targets shift according to the trips to work, 
school, and leisure settings” (Felson & Clarke, 1998: 16).  The DTES 
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because of its place in the history of Vancouver is a central area or hub 
of activity.  Many of the transit routes that enter the city of Vancouver 
stop at Main and Hastings Street.  This access to transit, combined 
with the proximity of Gastown and Chinatown and the central business 
area is such that many people come into the area for legitimate 
reasons.  Some of these people become victims of crime, some are 
witnesses to the crime and disorder and in turn this impacts on the 
reputation of the area.   
 
One crime produces opportunities for another. 
 
This principle acknowledges that various types of crime have 
ancillary effects.  For example, many sex trade workers find 
themselves victims of assault or — even worse — homicide.  The type 
of crime in which they are already involved can potentially increase 
their risk of others.  Further the opportunity that the DTES provides for 
crime and disorder is such that many times people who are accused 
people today are victims tomorrow.  The presence of crime and 
bustling open-air drug markets provides the opportunity for other 
crimes.  In the DTES it is common for there to be turf wars over corners 
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to sell drugs from, drug rip offs and violence associated with the illicit 
trade.  
 
Some products offer more tempting crime opportunities. 
 
Smaller items with a high resale value are at higher risk of theft 
than larger items.  The rate of refrigerator theft from retail stores is 
significantly lower than that of compact disks.  The DTES with its high 
number of pawnshops creates an environment where offenders can 
quickly receive financial gains from crime.  The stealing and fencing of 
compact disks is so easy that some of the pawnshops have simply 
focused on this end of their business.  The offender can be prepared to 
receive 5 to 10 dollars for each CD.  A theft from auto where an 
offender steals CD’s can quickly earn the offender 50 dollars from the 
pawning of the CD’s.  That money is quickly used to purchase drugs, 
and the cycle repeats itself over and over.   
 
Social and technological changes produce new crime opportunities. 
 
New technology provides the opportunity for more types of theft.  
For example, remote-controlled garage door openers were found to 
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create a security breach, when technology allowed criminals to 
facilitate theft by recording the infrared signal, and then playing it back 
later to open the garage.  Relating this principle back to the DTES, prior 
to the Skytrain being put into place a criminal from Surrey or Burnaby 
would have a considerably longer amount of travel time in order to get 
to the DTES.  The Skytrain now has decreased that travel time to 45 
minutes from one end of the track at the King George Station to the 
DTES.   This technological improvement has changed the mobility for 
criminals in the lower mainland and has made the DTES more 
accessible to more people.   
 
Reducing opportunities can prevent crime. 
 
The CET is about placing more officers on the streets in the 
DTES in order to reduce the opportunity for offender to commit crimes.  
The presence of a police officer in the block can have the impact that 
crime does not occur in that block.  Prior to CET the use of drugs and 
the selling of drugs on the street was quite open, in fact often dealers 
would make these deals in front of police cars waiting at the light, the 
dealers recognized that the officers were likely assigned to higher 
priority calls and would not stop to arrest them.  The dealers also 
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recognize that officers on foot are more often available to deal with 
such issues and arrest is a very real potential consequence. 
 
  Many studies have evaluated changes, which resulted in 
successful reduction through the use of Situational Crime Prevention.  
In one example, the West German government decided in 1963 to 
make steering locks mandatory on all new and used vehicles.  This 
change in law made vehicles more difficult to steal, and vehicle theft 
correspondingly dropped by more than 60% (Clarke, ; Mathew, Clarke, 
Sturman, & Hough, 1976) in (Clarke, 1980). 
 
In a study conducted in England and Wales, researchers 
analyzed the relationship between car theft and the absence or 
presence of a physical security device, in order to determine whether a 
barrier to opportunity changed the pattern of crime.  Their comparison 
of the year 1969 to 1973 found a drastic reduction in vehicle theft once 
steering locks were introduced.  This study shows that through target 
hardening, crime can be prevented. 
 
A more recent study of street prostitution, a long-term social 
problem which many people have written off as unsolvable, found that 
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in London, England, police and other community agencies could in fact 
combat street prostitution by working together.  One initiative was to 
close off streets to decrease the ease of kerb crawlers in finding 
suitable women from whom to solicit sex (Mathews, 1993).  
 
Reducing opportunities does not usually displace crime. 
 
The proposition that attacking the opportunity for crime in one 
area simply displaces it to another area has been found lacking in 
substance.  Some displacement may occur, but generally not full 
displacement.  Displacement is said to occur in one of five ways: 
1. Geographical Displacement: crime can be moved from 
one location to another. 
2. Temporal Displacement: Crime can be moved from one 
time to another. 
3. Target Displacement: Crime can be directed away from 
one target to another. 
4. Tactical Displacement: One method of committing the 
crime can be substituted for another. 
5. Crime Type Displacement:  One kind of crime can be 
substituted for another (Felson & Clarke, 1998:25). 
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Displacement is not inevitable.  Three different reviews of displacement 
have occurred in Canada, the United States and the Netherlands and 
found that displacement occurs much less frequently or fully than was 
previously believed (Felson & Clarke, 1998:28).  In fact the Dutch 
Ministry of Justice found that in their study of situational crime 
prevention that in 22 of the 55 cases studied no displacement 
occurred.  Further in the remaining 33 studies of which displacement 
was found, only some of the crime seemed to be displaced.  Key to the 
discussion is that in no case was the amount of crime displaced equal 
to the crime prevented (Felson & Clarke, 1998:28).  In other words 
there was always some drop off of crime.  
 
         In considering some of the examples it can be seen that creative 
crime prevention techniques have resulted in decreases in crime with 
minimal or no associated displacement.  Let consider some of the 
cases: 
• Sweden:  New identification procedures greatly reduced check 
fraud 
• Australia: Target hardening in banks reduced bank robbery with 
no increase in other types of robberies. 
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• West Midlands: Increase in lighting on one estate did not 
displace crime to other estate.  
• Dover: Increased security in car park did not displace to other 
local car parks (Felson & Clarke, 1998:27).  
 
The DTES and CET will be discussed in the final chapter relating to 
displacement. 
 
Focused opportunity reduction can produce wider declines in crime. 
 
When a community perceives that crime prevention tactics have 
been increased, or broadened in influence, diffusion of benefits can 
occur.  The CET in its initial deployment is focusing on the DTES, 
however, by its name the unit is a city wide task force.  Citywide implies 
that the CET could be deployed in other areas of the city to deal with 
current or new emerging problems.  The creation of this unit alone 
could potentially have a diffusion of benefits for the citizens of 
Vancouver.  The diffusion of benefits concept is that when a crime 
prevention technique is put into place, often the offenders are unsure of 
exactly where these prevention methods have been placed.  Therefore 
the offenders often assume that the crime prevention technique has a 
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wider sphere of control that it actually does.  There are many examples 
of this including, CCTV installed in car parks, vandalism on school 
busses, library books, and vehicle tracking systems (Felson & Clarke, 
1998:30).     
 
Now that we have considered the contributions of Rational 
Choice theorists, Routine Activity theorists and Situational Crime 
Prevention theorists, we will turn to the focus of our discussion, Broken 
Windows Theory. 
 
Broken Windows Theory 
Kelling and Wilson’s Broken Windows Theory is based on the work by 
Dr. Philip Zimbardo.  In 1969, Zimbardo, placed two similar cars into 
neighborhoods and then left both vehicles unattended.  One of the cars 
was left in the Bronx and the other in Palo Alto, California.  The car in 
the Bronx was left without license plates and the hood up, within ten 
minutes the vehicle was vandalized.  The vehicle in Palo Alto survived 
for over a week untouched.  Zimbardo then decided to smash the car 
with a sledgehammer; within a few hours it too was the victim of 
vandalism (J. Q. Wilson & Kelling, 1982: 5). 
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Broken Windows Theory, first espoused by Dr. George Kelling 
and James Wilson in an article in the Atlantic Monthly, is one of the 
most controversial criminology theories of contemporary times.  Its 
hypothesis is that if social and physical disorder in a community is not 
addressed, more serious forms of disorder and eventually increased 
levels of crime will follow (J. Q. Wilson & Kelling, 1982:5).  In their 
analogy of the broken window, where a window is broken people will 
begin to believe that no one cares for the property, and eventually 
more windows will be broken.  I will describe the DTES in greater detail 
in chapter 3, but its prolific, blatant, street-level drug trafficking and 
drug use leaves the distinct impression that no one cares.  This creates 
an environment where criminality is the norm and order is simply a 
concept for other neighborhoods. 
 
This theory is of particular importance to our discussion because 
the work of Dr. Wilson, Skogan and Keeling combined with its 
application by Mr. Bill Bratton has been of keen interest to many police 
officers and managers.  The turnaround that New York City saw in the 
mid 1990’s changed the face of policing in North America.  The results 
that Bill Bratton produced convinced many that the police could make a 
difference.  While Bratton was the police commissioner from 1994 to 
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1996, subway crime fell by 80%, serious crime went down by 60% and 
the murder rate dropped by 70% (Ballard, :1).  Bratton recognized the 
influence that Broken Windows Theory had on his direction in the 
document, Police Strategy Number 5: Reclaiming the Public Spaces of 
New York.  In the policy paper Bratton outlined that he believed that 
disorder and crime were related and that the police would need to 
focus on quality of life issues if they were to be successful in fighting 
crime (Bratton & Giuliani, 1994:6).    This theory is also the basis of the 
CET project.  Academic research would suggest that Situational Crime 
Prevention, Rational Choice and Routine Activity Theory are at least as 
applicable to the DTES as Broken Windows Theory, if not more so — 
however, the practical successes of Broken Windows Theory render it 
the more compelling theory for police managers, looking to resolve 
disorder and crime problems on their beat. 
 
In one of the first studies conducted to test Broken Windows 
Theory, Skogan surveyed 13 000 people from forty urban residential 
neighborhoods in Atlanta, Chicago, Houston, Philadelphia, Newark and 
San Francisco, asking them about their experiences with crime — their 
fears, their actions, and what they believed regarding neighborhood 
disorder.  Skogan's field researchers also observed instances of public 
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disorder in ten neighborhoods (G. Kelling & Coles, 1996: 24).  In the 
study he found that most people agreed on a definition of disorder in 
that the bulk of the people found disorder to be in one of two 
categories, social disorder and physical disorder(Skogan, 1990:2).  
Social disorder was public drinking, public drug use, street harassment, 
corner gangs, noisy neighbors and street prostitution (Skogan, 
1990:32).  Further, physical disorder included vandalism, dilapidation 
and abandonment and rubbish (Skogan, 1990:43).   
 
  One key finding was that in “neighborhoods with higher crime 
levels, disorder was linked more strongly with crime than were other 
characteristics of the area — poverty, instability in the housing market, 
and predominantly minority racial composition amongst residents”(G. 
Kelling & Coles, 1996 :25).  This study and these particular findings 
have provided much empirical support for police strategies which tackle 
crime through the eradication of disorder (Katz, Webb, & Schaefer, 
2001:2). 
 
Skogan's study has received much criticism from Harcourt 
(1998) and from Eck and Maguire (2000).  Harcourt claims that there is 
no empirical validity to the link Skogan claims to have made between 
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crime and disorder (Harcourt, 2001:60), and further criticizes Broken 
Windows Theory by claiming that cracking down on disorder in fact 
perpetuates crime by creating a new class of deviants (Rimensnyder, 
2001: 3).  In addition, Harcourt cites two primary reasons against the 
theory: that crime has also decreased in cities that do not apply Broken 
Wndows Theory; and that its identification of “losers” who attract police 
attention has been accompanied by a 60% increase in complaints of 
police misconduct (Rimensnyder, 2001: 4). 
 
Harcourt specifically criticizes Skogan's data, claiming that they 
were patched together from five separate studies which were not 
entirely consistent, and that as a result his study is missing a large 
amount of information.  Statistics on robbery victimization are available 
in only thirty neighbourhoods, and information on disorder is missing on 
average thirty to forty percent of the time (Harcourt, 2001:60).  
Moreover, Harcourt refutes Skogan's claim of a relation between 
robbery and disorder, noting that even in Skogan's own study, no 
relationship was found between disorder and burglary, rape, physical 
assault, or purse snatching (Harcourt, 2001:60). 
 
  33 
Eck and Maguire concluded, after examining Skogan's work, 
that the results do not provide a sound basis for social policy (Katz et 
al., 2001).  Skogan's failuire to use a cross-sectional methodology has 
also been criticized.  “Taylor argued that to adequately test Wilson and 
Kelling’s 'broken windows' hypothesis, which is longitudinal, 
researchers must use a longitudinal design and examine a large 
number of communities” (Katz et al., 2001 : 3). 
 
Other critics have suggested alternate reasons for the decline in 
New York's crime rate, which are unrelated to Broken Windows 
Theory.  One such claim is that the reduction occurred because of a 
change in drug use (Bowling, 1999:13): 
 
 Among the most convincing explanations for the rise and fall of 
New York murder in the last decades of this century is the 
simultaneous rise and fall of crack cocaine.  This changing 
social context, together with the combined effect of 
preventative work among local communities and a rejection of 
crack cocaine and guns by a new generation of young people 
provides a credible alternative account to that generated by 
media smart police (Bowling, 1999:13). 
 
Further critics have associated the decline in crime with 
changes to police practices regarding street dealing and gun offenses 
(Johnson, Golup, & Dunlap, 2000) in (G. L. Kelling & Sousa, 2001:3).  
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They claim that the decline is due not to the application of Broken 
Windows Theory, but to police targeting of high-risk offenders. 
 
Critics have also credited the increased legitimacy of social 
institutions such as family and education with the decline of crime in 
New York City (LaFree, 1998) in (G. L. Kelling & Sousa, 2001:3).  
These theorists reject both Broken Windows Theory and other police 
efforts, claiming instead that the true reason for the reduction is the 
change in family practices. 
 
Still other critics point to a similar decline in crime rates within 
other American cities, which have not adopted practices associated 
with Broken Windows Theory.  “San Francisco in fact adopted less 
strident law enforcement policies that reduced arrests, prosecutions, 
and incarceration rates” (Jamison, 2002:1).  The San Francisco area 
saw a reduction in violent crime by 47% between 1992 and 1998 — 
more even than New York City's reduction of 46%.  In addition, San 
Francisco decreased its incarceration rate from 2136 individuals in 
1993 to 703 individuals in 1998 (Jamison, 2002:6). 
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Similar decreases were also found in other cities that had not 
incorporated Broken Windows Theory.  Marshall points out that the 
cities of Chicago, San Diego, Washington D.C. and Los Angeles also 
reported drops in crime without instituting Broken Windows Theory.  
These agencies instead adopted the less “coercive” methods of 
community policing (Marshall, 1999:4).  The interesting thing about this 
is that community policing and Broken Windows policing are very 
similar.  Community policing done correctly ensures that the community 
and the police working in partnership define priorities for the policing of 
the community.  It has became apparent that as these relationships 
flourish that order maintenance and quality of life issues are of high 
importance to citizens.  This focus is consistent with Broken Windows 
Theory.  In addition when a police agency becomes less concerned 
with traditional 911-response policing, and switches to a mode that is 
more responsive to the community's quality of life, it is not practicing 
Broken Windows Theory is incorrect.  The police agency which uses 
proactive intelligence to clean up problem premises is in fact fixing the 
broken windows of the area. 
 
Several studies have been completed, however, which support 
the theory that order maintenance will bring about reduction in crime.  
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While attending a 1982 conference at the Harvard Executive Session, 
Dr. Kelling first delivered his paper on Broken Windows.  A police 
officer named Bill Bratton heard the academic, and believed that some 
of the concepts Kelling spoke of were consistent with Bratton's own 
experiences.  Interestingly, it was not until Bratton became Chief of 
Police for the Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority (MBTA) in 
May 1983 that he got to put some of these concepts to work.  
According to Bratton’s book Turnaround, his first course of action as 
Chief of Police was to eradicate the disorder within the ranks of the 
police officers.  The professional standards that he set and enforced 
quickly turned an organization with serious issues into a professional 
crime-fighting department.  Commenting on this, Bratton states, “[Y[ou 
can't overstate the effect of the chief of police showing up in a subway 
station.  Symbolically, it means that every station is going to be policed, 
and every station is going to be policed correctly” (Bratton & Knobler, 
1998: 123).  Bratton's leadership and commitment to reducing crime 
through disorder eradication or minimization resulted in a drop of 27% 
of all crime on the MBTA (Bratton & Knobler, 1998:127).   
 
The Broken Windows Theory is born from Situational Crime 
Prevention, Routine Activity Theory and Rational Choice Theory.  
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Broken Windows Theory believes that people will make rational 
choices about neighborhoods in which to commit crime, based on the 
level of commitment to public safety in these communities.  In addition, 
Broken Windows theory simply believes that by attacking order 
maintenance issues the community will feel safer and that crime will 
decline. 
 
This belief that proactive police tactics work has been borne out 
in several academic studies.  One United States study concluded that 
the rate of traffic violation tickets issued by a police department was 
inversely related to the number of robberies in that city.  Wilson and 
Boland studied aggressive policing and crime in 35 large cities and 
concluded that aggressive patrol strategies deter robberies (Wilson and 
Boland, 1978) in (Katz et al., 2001:3).   Their study was later replicated 
with a larger sample and slightly altered methodology by Sampson and 
Cohen, who researched the relationship between traffic tickets issued 
and disorderly conduct arrests per officer, and also concluded that 
aggressive policing resulted in lower robbery rates (Katz et al., 2001:3). 
 
Weiss and Freels, however, conducted a similar study in 
Dayton, Ohio, with results that criticized Wilson and Boland.  Breaking 
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the police into two areas, one the control area and the other the 
experiment area, they asked the officers in the experiment area to 
pursue and ticket traffic violators aggressively.  The officers in the 
experimental group made three times as many stops as in the control 
group, and showed an increased number of arrests for driving under 
the influence, and for possession of drugs and weapons.  Yet there 
was no direct drop in index crimes (Katz et al., 2001: 3).  These 
conclusions are troubling because the seizure of drugs and weapons, 
and the stopping of drunk drivers, are of themselves examples of crime 
reduction.  Therefore could it still not be said that aggressive, proactive 
policing reduces crime? 
 
Following the research of Sherman, many police departments 
have directed resources at specific neighborhoods in an effort to curb 
crime and disorder at particular locations.  Though there are several 
studies of these initiatives, the scope of this paper does not allow for 
significant examination here.  However, one study that particularly 
merits mention is known as the "hot spots" policing study.  “The Crime 
Control Institute and Rutgers University identified 110 hot spots and 
then randomly selected 55 of these spots to receive more aggressive 
policing.  Using calls for service and observational data, researchers 
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reported that calls for service for crime decreased by 6% to 13% and 
that disorder decreased by 50% in the targeted areas, in comparison to 
the control areas” (Katz et al., 2001: 4).  This study shows that police 
officers working in a proactive, targeted fashion can make positive 
changes and improve community safety. 
 
When we turn to police initiatives targeted at disorder instead of 
crime, as mentioned before, we find some additional results.  Sherman 
(1990) investigated the effects of disorder policing on serious crime.  
Examining a Washington D.C. order-maintenance crackdown on public 
drinking and parking violations, and its impact on robberies, Sherman 
found that the crackdown had a positive effect on people's perception 
of safety in the area, but not on the actual number of robberies (Katz et 
al., 2001:4). 
 
Novak et al (1999) examined the enforcement of liquor laws 
versus the rate of robbery and burglary.  The aggressive enforcement 
strategy in this study took place over a 30-day period in an 
experimental area.  The authors concluded that the intervention did not 
have a significant effect on the rates of robbery or burglary, although 
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they do admit that this could be due to the brevity of the study (Novak, 
Hartman, Holsinger, & Turner, 1999) in (Katz et al., 2001:5).  
 
Katz criticizes both these studies because they looked at 
reducing order simply by reducing alcohol-related crimes.  Katz refers 
to this as fixing every tenth broken window — the purpose of Broken 
Windows Theory being to fix every broken window, so that people have 
a sense that the community is cared for and that antisocial behavior will 
not be accepted. 
 
Kelling and Coles reported, in their study of the New York City 
Transit subway system, that with a clean-up of graffiti, interaction with 
disorderly people, and moving along of homeless people, there was a 
significant reduction in serious crime (G. Kelling & Coles, 1996: 109).  
They found that the people committing minor crimes, such as fare 
beating, were also those involved in more serious crime.  For example, 
“in certain neighborhoods, as many as one arrestee in ten was either 
wanted on a felony charge or carrying an illegal weapon (G. Kelling & 
Coles, 1996: 134).  Furthermore, after order maintenance and Broken 
Windows Theories were implemented into operational policing 
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strategies, felonies on New York subways declined by 75%, and 
specifically robberies declined by 64% (G. Kelling & Coles, 1996: 152). 
 
The Jersey Police Department also initiated a strategy to deal 
with crime through reducing disorder.  The department's Violent Crime 
Unit was tasked to find the most common violent crime locations in 
their city.  Once these were determined, Problem Oriented Policing 
Projects were created to address disorder in these problem locations.  
Research findings suggest that the Jersey Police Department was 
effective in reducing disorder, and more importantly that both crime 
incidents and calls for police service were reduced (Braga et al., 1999) 
in (Katz et al., 2001: 6). 
 
In Chandler, Arizona, the Broken Windows thesis was further 
scrutinized in an examination of the Chandler Police Department’s 
quality of life initiative, “Operation Restoration”.  This project combined 
a police resource team with a city licensing and permit team, which 
was tasked with ensuring that homeowners in the affected areas were 
diligent in repairing or maintaining their homes.  These efforts 
combined with intensive police order maintenance and proactive 
enforcement policies to minimize public disorder.  The study showed a 
  42 
decrease in morality-related crime and disorder, but also showed no 
change if not an increase in overall calls for service related to crime.  
The researchers concluded that a Broken Windows police initiative can 
have a positive impact on some forms of crime, but not necessarily on 
other forms of crime.  The authors did interview police officers who 
believed that the results may be skewed by an emerging gang crime 
problem in the tested area (Katz et al., 2001: 17).  
 
Broken Windows Theory has also been practiced in Hartlepool, 
England, when under the leadership of Detective Chief Inspector 
Mallon, the Cleveland Constabulary began to implement Broken 
Windows Theory and the enforcement of nuisance-type crime.  The 
crime rates for the Hartlepool area had doubled between 1980 and 
1992, and more specifically, in the four months prior to DCI Mallon's 
taking over, the crime rate had risen by 38% (Dennis & Mallon, 1997) 
in (Marshall, 1999:6).  Using Broken Windows Theory as a blueprint, 
Mallon encouraged his officers to consider quality of life issues, and to 
focus on the minor crimes as well as the larger crimes.  The results, 
according to Mallon, were a total reduction in crime by 27%, and in 
particular reductions in vehicle theft by 56% and in domestic burglary 
by 31% (Dennis & Mallon, 1997) in (Marshall, 1999:7). 
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In December 2001, responding to some of the critics of the New 
York City police department's successes in reducing crime, Dr. Kelling 
and Dr. Sousa conducted an additional study of New York crime rates.  
They conducted field observations and considered crime reports to 
draw conclusions that, once again, showed a causal relationship 
between misdemeanor (less serious crimes) arrests and reduction in 
violent crime.  After their examinations of various sources of 
information, Kelling and Sousa state that when order maintenance 
increases, violent crime decreases (G. L. Kelling & Sousa, 2001:7).  
Responding to the criticism that the declines occurred because of a 
decrease in crack cocaine use, they concluded that neither the number 
of young males in a precinct, nor the number of borough cocaine 
episodes, are significantly related to that precinct's violent crime rate 
(G. L. Kelling & Sousa, 2001:9).  Moreover, they also found that while 
unemployment bears a relationship to violent crime, it is not as one 
would predict: an increase in unemployment actually proved to be 
related to a decrease in violent crime (G. L. Kelling & Sousa, 2001:9).  
Most revealing, however, is their principal finding: 
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The number of precinct misdemeanor arrests is significantly 
related to precinct violent crime.  In fact, this measure of “broken 
windows” policing is the strongest predictor of precinct violent 
crime in this model.  The coefficient is negative (-0.036) which 
indicates an inverse relationship between our measure of 
“broken windows” and violent crime: as misdemeanor arrests 
increase, violent crime decreases.  Stated more specifically, the 
coefficient of -.036 means that on average, for every 
misdemeanor arrest in a given precinct, there were .036 fewer 
violent crimes committed (G. L. Kelling & Sousa, 2001:9). 
 
Based on this 2001 research, the authors concluded that, “contrary to 
'root cause' advocates, overall declines in violent crime cannot be 
attributed to economy, drug use, or demographics" (G. L. Kelling & 
Sousa, 2001:9).  Instead such reduction is the result of police efforts. 
 
Though not an exhaustive literature review, my touching-down 
approach has addressed, albeit briefly, most of the leading 
commentators on the issue of causes of crime and disorder.  The value 
of conducting this research on the CET and the DTES is that the 
principles of Broken Windows Theory, and whether the police do 
matter, have not been researched before in Canada.  Canada has an 
entrenched Charter of Rights and Freedoms, which precludes 
Canadian police from engaging in some of the proactive police 
initiatives that occurred in New York, such as civil injunctions, nor in the 
stop-and-search powers enjoyed by United Kingdom officers.  The 
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research completed here will open the door to further examination of 
police practices in Canada.  As we have seen in the literature here 
reviewed, there are many points of view with equally compelling 
evidence.  In presenting my research on the CET in the DTES, I hope 
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C h a p t e r  T h r e e - C i t y w i d e  E n f o r c e m e n t  T e a m  a n d  t h e  
D o w n t o w n  E a s t s i d e  
 
          The Downtown Eastside is one of the oldest neighborhoods in 
the City of Vancouver, British Columbia.  Located in the southwest 
corner of Canada, the city is surrounded by water on three sides and 
has a population of 560 000 people.  In addition, it is the hub of 
entertainment, business, and education for the larger Greater 
Vancouver Region, which has a population base of two million people.  
Vancouver is the largest city in British Columbia, and the third largest in 
Canada; with a bustling Port and a vibrant tourist industry, it is also 
considered Canada's gateway to Asia (About Vancouver, : Web Page).  
This chapter will spend some time describing the Downtown Eastside 
and outlining the history of the community, as well as describing its 
current policing operations. 
 
          Once the heart of the City of Vancouver — the main library and 
city hall, now the building is called the Carnegie Center, were once 
located on the corner of Hastings Street and Main Street — the 
Downtown Eastside is now tragically described as the poorest postal 
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code in Canada.  Its problems with crime and substance misuse have 
been topics of national discussion (Community History, : Web Page).   
 
In the late nineteenth century, the Downtown Eastside's several 
hotels, shops and service providers provided services to the men who 
came into town from the logging and mining camps.  But in 1958 the 
streetcars quit running to the Downtown Eastside, and in the early 
1960s the City of Vancouver permitted a large shopping complex called 
Pacific Centre to be built some distance to the west.  The region began 
to feel the pains of less business, and housing prices began to 
decrease.  This in turn provided an opportunity for lower income 
housing, and when psychiatric patients were de-institutionalized in the 
early 1970s, the era of "Community Care," the Downtown Eastside 
became a viable place for them to live.  The combination of less viable 
business opportunities, lower transient populations, and more 
psychiatric patients in the area made the Downtown Eastside an 
attractive place for drug traffickers to build their customer base. 
 
In the 1980s the drug of choice changed from heroin to cocaine, 
and with cocaine came an increase in violence.  Cocaine's effects on 
people, contrasted with those of heroin, increased the neighborhood’s 
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problems.  Whereas heroin causes people to become drowsy while 
under the influence, cocaine can cause people to become violent and 
paranoid.    Crime in the area produced the quasi-legitimate business 
of pawn shops, which purchase goods from people significantly below 
market cost, and then resell them for a higher cost, but still below 
market value.  The presence of pawn shops makes it difficult for 
legitimate businesses to survive. 
 
      In 1992, Woodward’s department stores — one of the largest and 
most well-established retailers in the city — went out of business, 
taking with it the flagship store on Hastings Street (Community History, 
:Web Page).  The site of the store was in November 2002 taken over 
by poverty advocates who had to be removed by police. 
 
The DTES in 1996 had a population of 16 825 people — about 
2.9% of the city's total — on a land area of approximately 3.86 square 
kilometers, or 3.3% of the entire city.    The proportion of DTES 
residents considered to be in the low-income bracket is about 68%.  A 
total of 93% (4816) of its dwellings are rented, with 5179 homes 
designated single room occupancy.    The criminal code offence rate in 
the area is 812 offences per 1000 people — quite high compared to the 
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rest of the city, whose rate is 116/1000.  Further exacerbating the 
DTES' problems is that, despite its small size and population, it 
contains fully 25% of the liquor-licensed seats for the city, and over 
26% of the total liquor licenses for the city (Prox, 2003a: Appendix). 
 
The Downtown Eastside's issues are similar to those faced in 
many urban areas of the world.  These include a high rate of drug 
addiction and dealing, HIV infection, prostitution, crime, lack of 
adequate housing, high unemployment, and the loss of many legitimate 
businesses (Downtown Eastside Revitalization, : Web Page).  
 
In the DTES, these issues are very real.  The City of Vancouver 
has averaged 147 overdoses per year on illicit drugs, with many 
occurring in the DTES (MacPherson, 2000:1).  This overdose rate has 
prompted many different social service providers to set up shop in the 
DTES, to bring services to the people who need them the most.  
Unfortunately — and while I am not suggesting that these services are 
necessarily a bad thing, one must recognize the effects of such a 
concentration of service providers upon the issues of public disorder in 
the area — this has further exacerbated the “one-stop shop” for drug 
users and dealers.  Not all users of these services live in the DTES; 
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many travel to the DTES to engage them.  Nor do all of the drug users:  
one study has shown that 40 percent of individuals who misuse drugs 
in the DTES live outside of the area (Vancouver Injection Drug Users 
Survey, 2000) in (MacPherson, 2000:7).  In addition to the influx of 
drug users, there is a high rate of disease amongst the area’s 
residents: 30 percent of the DTES’ drug addicts have HIV, and more 
than 90 percent have Hepatitis C (Thompson, 2003:3). 
 
A recent unpublished research report by Constable Gerry 
Wickstead and criminology students Gareth Bradley and Jennifer Parks 
found interesting data regarding the drug users in the DTES.  Over 
eight days in January 2003, they interviewed 100 people openly using 
drugs in the DTES — the participants volunteered to be interviewed 
and confidentiality was assured.  They found that 94% of the addicts 
used heroin or cocaine daily; 67% spent more than 50 dollars per day 
on their habit; and 73% of the participants were over the age of thirty, 
with drug addictions that had lasted for well over a decade (Wickstead, 
Parks, & Bradley, 2003:4). 
 
In reviewing the addicts’ criminality, the research found that: 
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The money is easy to obtain and there is a small risk of being 
caught.  In 2001 those responsible for 88% of reported crime in 
the City of Vancouver were never criminally charged.  Let’s face 
it, the chances of getting charged with a criminal offence in British 
Columbia and then going to jail is quite low.  Each year the 
general public reports about 500,000 criminal incidents and in 
British Columbia we have a prison capacity of roughly 4,400 jail 
beds.  Statistics Canada estimates the public really only reports 
about a third of actual crime that is out there.  For every 100 
adults charged with a criminal offence in this province 13 were 
sentenced to custody (Wickstead et al., 2003:5). 
 
In considering the cost of purchasing drugs to support such a 
habit, the research notes that the DTES is reportedly the poorest 
neighborhood in Canada.  Now, a piece of crack cocaine, or a small 
paper flap of powder cocaine, commonly sells for $10 each, while small 
quantities of heroin can sell for either $10 or $20.  It is estimated that 
the DTES has 4 times as many crack cocaine users as injection drug 
users on the streets; and cocaine users inject drugs more frequently 
than individuals using heroin.   In 2001, Vancouver saw an average of 
8 936 syringes distributed every day.  If each syringe were only used 
once to inject an illicit drug, we could conservatively estimate the 
number of illicit drug doses to be 44 680 each day.  Multiplied by $10 a 
dose, this comes to $446 800 spent every day, or $16.3 million spent 
on illicit drugs in the area annually.  This figure also does not account 
for the many user traffickers who receive their drugs for work in kind 
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arrangements.  Moreover 67 of the 100 respondents admitted to 
spending at least $50 a day on illicit drugs.  This works out to $1 500 
per month — or twice what the average BC homeowner is paying on 
their mortgage.  Additionally 47% of the respondents claimed to spend 
$100 or more a day on illicit drugs, or $36 500 in annual drug spending.  
An individual with a legitimate occupation, funding such a costly drug 
habit, would have to gross at least $52 000 a year before tax — and 
this does not yet include paying for food, shelter, clothing, 
transportation, or other personal expenses.  The user would have to 
earn the equivalent of $27 an hour (Wickstead et al., 2003:5). 
 
With regard to open drug use, and the associated public disorder that 
occurs when people use drugs on a city street, the research found: 
 
78% of the respondents stated they used the drugs 
immediately, “right away”, after they purchased them on the street.  
22% stated they waited over 30 minutes or longer after the purchase 
before they used drugs.  85% said they regularly used drugs outside 
in public view on the DTES streets and alleys whereas 15% said 
they waited until they were inside a building at their home or at a 
friend’s place (Wickstead et al., 2003:6). 
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The chance of being caught by the police and charged with a criminal 
offence is so negligible that drug addicts in the DTES do not even 
consider it when choosing to use drugs: 
 
      Almost all of the respondents echoed the opinion that the 
Downtown Eastside  was an attractive place for people openly buying 
and using drugs because there was no fear of prosecution and cheap 
high quality drugs were easy to obtain.  Reviewing Vancouver Police 
drug enforcement statistics it is easy to see why people do not fear 
being charged with drug possession.   
 
For over a decade, people have rarely been charged with drug 
possession in Vancouver.  In 1992 there were a total of 812 charges of 
either heroin or cocaine possession in Vancouver which averages out 
to 2.2 charges per day.  At the same time the Vancouver Needle 
Exchange was distributing an average of 1,664 needles per day.  In 
2000 there were a total of 242 charges of either heroin or cocaine 
possession in Vancouver (less then 1 charge a day).  During that same 
year an average of 9,454 needles was distributed in Vancouver each 
day (Wickstead et al., 2003:6). 
 
The history of police enforcement actions in the DTES has not 
been well documented.  It is fair to say that there has always been a 
stronger presence of foot patrol officers in the Downtown Eastside than 
in other areas of the city; however, this allotment of officers has not 
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always remained at the same strength.  Sergeant Tony Zannatta 
recalls that earlier in his career, 16 officers would be assigned to 
walking posts in the DTES on any given night (Zannatta, 2003: 
personal interview).   In the last few years that number has significantly 
decreased — and for a period in the late 1990s, the police even 
adopted a policy of containment, in which the removal of foot patrol 
teams to surrounding areas was meant to encourage people to use 
drugs only in the DTES (Knight, 2003:2). 
 
The City of Vancouver has been proactive in trying to get a 
handle on the issues of public disorder and the drug trade.  Former 
Mayor Philip Owen released a framework for action in 2000, and the 
City adopted a Four Pillars approach in May 2001.  Since initiating 
such an approach, with its four pillars of harm reduction, prevention, 
treatment and enforcement (Campbell, 2003:4), the cities of Geneva, 
Zurich, Frankfurt and Sydney, Australia have seen a dramatic reduction 
in open drug use, overdose deaths and spread of disease (Campbell, 
2003:6).  In preparing for a similar implementation, the Vancouver 
Police has continued to be a proactive and professional police service. 
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Working in partnership with government and the community, the 
Vancouver Police Department has tried very hard to make the 
community a safer place.  While the issues they face are not easy to 
tackle, the recent movement toward the harm reduction approach is a 
courageous forward step. 
 
The Vancouver Police will be tasked with the enforcement pillar, 
which will include increased focus on the “for-profit” drug traffickers, 
and more awareness training for police on drug abuse (An Alcohol and 
Drug Action Plan for the Downtown Eastside/Strathcona 
Draft Plan, 2001:29). 
 
The goal of the Citywide Enforcement Team, or CET, is to 
reduce disorder in the DTES so that the proposed injection site will be 
successful.  Here I must recognize and address my own bias.  The 
proposed injection sites for the DTES are called “safe injection sites,” 
which I believe, as do many others, is a misrepresentation:  there is 
nothing safe about injecting heroin purchased from a street dealer into 
your body.  If the government would like to call them “safe,” then the 
heroin should be produced, tested and supplied by government.  
Consequently, in this essay I will refer to these centres as “supervised 
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injection sites,” which I feel to be a more honest term — for much as 
they improve upon what currently exists, truly their only safeguard is 
that they are supervised. 
 
People who want to use Supervised Injection Sites must be able 
to access them without having to run a gauntlet of dealers — and there 
must be a real punishment for people who refuse them.  A drug user 
who is three blocks away from a supervised injection site, yet who runs 
no risk of apprehension by the police for using on a public street, will 
not generally make the three-block trek.  Anyone who disputes this 
does not understand the power of addiction.  People will, however, 
make that trek if they realize that using drugs on the street could get 
them arrested and charged, or at least could have their drugs 
destroyed by the police.  Prior to the implementation of the CET, the 
state of police enforcement in the DTES was so understaffed that there 
was very little risk of losing one’s drugs. 
 
The Vancouver Police have tried to find enough resources to 
return order to the DTES.  Over the last couple of years this has meant 
reallocating resources to the area.  However, the cost of such projects 
is often too great to sustain.  One example of a police project which 
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showed how commitment and dedicated resources could resolve a 
problem, at least over a small area, was 2002’s Project Seinfeld. 
 
Project Seinfeld was a police operation based on the idea 
behind the popular situation comedy Seinfeld, which has been 
described as a show about nothing (Rich, 2003: Personal Interview).  
In this project, police officers were expected to stand in small groups in 
the epicenter of the drug trade in Vancouver, a City-owned community 
center known as the Carnegie Center.  Police officers were simply to 
be a presence in the area.  The Carnegie, at 401 Main Street, is also a 
home to services and outreach programs for homeless and drug-
addicted people.  The nearby drug trade and related disorder have 
consequently flourished, and have caused many legitimate businesses 
in the area to close, while others have expended an immense amount 
of money on private police in order to protect their customers.  The 
tactic of placing highly visible police officers in front of the Carnegie 
Center is similar to the tactics of zero tolerance and Broken Windows 
Theory, in that the police department and its officers have reclaimed 
the space.  Any obvious lawbreaking results in arrest; however, the 
focus of the officer’s time is spent simply in being a presence, and in 
maintaining law and order (Rich, 2003: Personal Interview). 
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Project Seinfeld commenced on November 6, 2002 and 
concluded on January 6, 2003, during which time two officers from 
each shift spent time standing in front of 401 Main Street.  An 
examination of Vancouver Police calls for service between Sept 5, 
2002 and November 5, 2002 shows that 438 calls originated from that 
location, while during the two months of Project Seinfeld, only 244 calls 
were generated — a dramatic drop of 44% in the number of police calls 
for service to the Carnegie Centre (Rayment, 2003:2).  The presence 
of police officers on a near constant basis at the Carnegie Centre had a 
spectacular effect on the calls for service and on public disorder.     
 
The challenge for the Vancouver Police was the quite 
substantial cost of maintaining social order at 401 Main Street, a cost 
which was arguably not sustainable without the commitment of 
additional resources.  Eventually these short-term projects must end, 
and ultimately the problems recur. 
 
        Under the leadership of Chief Constable Jamie Graham, the 
Vancouver Police have made the DTES an organizational priority.  
Graham and his senior management team see the restoration of order 
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in the DTES to be crucial to the success of the four pillars approach.  
Backed by a strong commitment from senior management, Inspector 
Jim Chu, Inspector Bob Rich, Inspector Doug Lepard and Sergeant 
Zannatta were tasked in 2003 with identifying and implementing the 
Citywide Enforcement Team. 
 
Inspector Bob Rich first presented the CET to the Vancouver 
Police Board at their regular meeting on March 26, 2003.  During this 
meeting, Inspector Rich described the Vancouver Police’s support for 
the opening of supervised injection sites, and mentioned that two police 
Sergeants had been sent to Amsterdam and Sydney, Australia to see 
how the sites in these cities worked — and in particular, to learn how 
police coexisted with them.  He further presented an organizational 
priority adopted by the police executive, to reduce the crime and 
disorder of illicit drug use in Vancouver.  In order to accomplish this, the 
police department would form a three-month task force, in co-operation 
with the Health Board, with 60 dedicated police members.  40 of these 
officers would be assigned from throughout the department, while 20 
would be current district 2 members.  The City of Vancouver is made 
up of 4 policing districts; the DTES is part of district two which is the 
district which cover the northeast sector of the city. In addition to 
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assess the results of CET, two analysts would be assigned to monitor 
the results (Vancouver Police Board: Minutes of the regular meeting, 
2003:2). 
 
When the CET began its increased foot patrol presence in the 
DTES on April 7, 2003, the Vancouver Police Drug Squad had just 
completed a three-week operation called Project Torpedo.  From 
March 18, 2003 to April 4, 2003, undercover police officers had 
purchased drugs from dealers in the DTES.  In just three weeks, 162 
individuals were arrested for trafficking — a number illustrative of the 
scope of the drug problem in the DTES (Campbell, 2003:15). 
 
The CET initiative has been criticized by some and applauded 
by others.  Media reporting has been generally positive; however, a 
Human Rights Watch report generated much discussion about alleged 
human rights violations at the hands of police in the DTES.  Issued on 
May 7, 2003, one month after the CET became operational, this report 
describes the use of excessive force by police and widespread, 
arbitrary harassment (Bula, 2003:B3).  The City of Vancouver 
responded to the report by saying that the allegations of police 
misconduct were based on hearsay and were not supported with 
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evidence.  The response also affirms that the CET’s impact on the 
health of drug users is very important to the city, and notes that 
additional resources have been put into place to ensure such impact is 
minimal.  Another section explains the powers of Canadian police to 
detain people when they are suspected of committing a crime 
(Campbell, 2003:17) 
 
Special Constable Ryan Prox of the Vancouver Police is one of the 
crime analysts assigned to monitor the CET.  In his report on the 
project’s first six weeks, he found that: 
in almost every incident category, there is a marked reduction in 
the DTES for the month of April 2003 when compared to the 
same month for the previous year.  Similarly, the number of 
incidents for the DTES in the month of April 2003 are lower in 
most categories compared to the month previous (Prox, 
2003a:3). 
 
Comparing April 2003 incident counts with those of April 2002, Prox 
concluded  
that drug incidents in the DTES had decreased by 22%, and 
theft from autos had decreased by 14%.  Robberies were down 
40% from 2002, although break and enters showed a slight 2% 
increase.  With regard to violent crime, the rate of assaults was 
down 5% from the previous year.  However, the most 
interesting statistic is a huge 28% decline in assaults between 
March 2003 and April 2003 (Prox, 2003a:4). 
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     In evaluating calls for service in the DTES, it should be noted that 
the number of such calls increased by 64.2% between 1991 and 2003, 
as compared to the city call load which increased by just 9.2%.  
Comparing the six-week period immediately prior to the CET (February 
24, 2003 to April 4, 2003) with the project’s first six weeks (April 5, 
2003 to May 14, 2003), Prox found a 12% increase in calls for service.  
However, these results are skewed by the vast number of warrant 
arrests made by Project Torpedo over the former period.  If one 
corrects for this by excluding the call type of “warrant” or “wagon,” the 
increase is only 2%.  In the outlying areas, or all other areas of district 
two, calls for service increased by 4% (Prox, 2003a:5). 
 
Prox also analysed changes within the Overnight Log Book, a 
book used by Patrol Sergeants to log any major incidents — shootings, 
stabbings, criminal vehicle pursuits, large drug arrests, or any other 
incident of significant note.  His review found a 64% decrease in the 
number of incidents of note in the DTES since CET became 
operational (Prox, 2003a:6). 
 
One concern with the CET was that an increased police 
presence on the street might force users off the street, to less safe 
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environments.  This was very much a issue for Mayor Campbell,  who 
questioned whether the CET should be postponed until the supervised 
injection sites were open (Vancouver Police Board: Minutes of the 
regular meeting, 2003:2).  However, Prox charted just 6 overdose 
deaths in the DTES in April 2003, a number consistent with past data 
(Prox, 2003a:6). 
 
Helping the DTES presents many challenges.  Police managers 
striving to find solutions are prepared to be innovative and courageous 
in order to try to start the DTES back on its road to healing.  The 
introduction of Rational Choice Theory, Situational Crime Prevention 
and Broken Windows Theory is part of this road.  In the next chapter, I 
will discuss my own research, and in particular my findings based on 
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C h a p t e r  F o u r -  R e s e a r c h  M e t h o d o l o g y  a n d  F i n d i n g s  
 
          The decision to implement a temporary Citywide Enforcement 
Team into the Downtown Eastside was one I found very intriguing.  I 
had worked as a patrol officer in the DTES from June 2000 to January 
2002, initially assigned to the Hastings Street walking beat.  It did not 
take me long to become frustrated with my role.  The police were no 
more than babysitters, relatively ineffective at keeping a lid on the 
disorder in the area.  The bulk of the time, as my two partners and I 
entered the 100 block East Hastings from the west, the problem people 
simply continued moving a block ahead of us.  As police, we just 
moved people along, and they very quickly returned after we had 
moved through each particular block.  I found this period very 
unrewarding. 
 
This personal experience, combined with an academic interest 
in Broken Windows Theory and Zero Tolerance policing, compelled me 
to approach the District Two Police Commander, Inspector Bob Rich, 
to ask whether I might be considered to help research the proposed 
CET.  I knew of the success with Project Seinfeld at the Carnegie 
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Centre, and believed that an expansion of this concept could bring 
positive changes to the Downtown Eastside. 
 
The police mangers who were the catalyst for the CET were 
Inspector Jim Chu and Inspector Bob Rich.   Both Chu and Rich were 
aware of the successes that New York City had on crime with the 
NYPD focus on order maintenance and disorder issues.  Inspectors 
Chu and Rich were very positive about the proposed CET and its 
similarities to New York City, however, the one point that they both 
made clear was that unlike New York’s initiative, the CET’s mandate 
would not involve zero tolerance.  The police focus would be on 
disorder.  Drug users would receive an initial warning, and after a 
predetermined transition period, drug users who still openly used drugs 
on the street might be arrested (Chu & Rich, 2003: Personal Interview).   
 
Early discussions occurred regarding access to information and 
confidentiality issues.  On March 5, 2003 I met with Inspector Chu and 
Sergeant Tony Zannatta, and expressed my concerns about research 
ethics, and the potential for gatekeepers to keep certain information 
from me.  For my research to be credible, I must feel comfortable 
submitting results even if they showed that the police did not have an 
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impact.  I was assured full cooperation and full autonomy.  In 
discussion of my research needs, Inspector Chu gave me the timeline 
for the Vancouver Police proposal to the Vancouver City Council, and 
suggested that pre-surveys and post-surveys from service providers in 
the area could also add validity.  We agreed that the Vancouver Police 
would provide equipment (cars, plainclothes radio holsters, radios) and 
human resources (at least two plainclothed police officers to follow the 
students) to my project.  As it turned out, the second walkalong 
required the Vancouver Police to incur overtime costs, which displayed 
the department’s commitment to the project and its evaluation. 
 
I fully recognized that I was a “inside insider” (Brown, 1996) in 
(Reiner, 2000:220), Brown’s term for police officers who conduct 
degree research on their own department.  Even though I had 
overcome the first hurdle, of access to information, I would have others.  
For example, several officers assigned to the CET expressed some 
bitterness and resistance to the project, having not been assigned 
there willingly.  To them I simply explained my independence from the 
project, noting that I would simply evaluate the effectiveness of the 
police.  Several of the officers assigned were junior to me in service, 
and had recently graduated from the Justice Institute of British 
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Columbia Police Academy, at which I teach — a fact which proved an 
additional advantage in distancing myself from the CET.  The academy 
is located outside of Vancouver, giving me no cause to enter the DTES 
except for research.  In addition, although I was offered overtime shifts 
in uniform in the DTES during this study, I refused them to minimize 
bias. 
 
My principal methodology was to have five students unfamiliar 
with the DTES walk through the neighborhood and record quantitative 
observations about public disorder and/or drug use.  I was aware of the 
issues involved in doing field research, but the research question, 
Could police make a positive difference to public disorder and crime in 
a community in crisis could only be tested in the field.  No laboratory 
can provide an adequate environment to test police impact on public 
disorder and crime.  The observational methods of this field experiment 
would lead to a highly realistic study.   
 
The downsides of this were many.  My first issue to contend with 
was that I am a police officer who had worked in the DTES before.  I 
remained fairly well known to many criminals in the area, and so I could 
clearly not make field observations myself.  I then considered asking 
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police recruits to perform the observations, new officers who had never 
been assigned to the street, and were still in their academy training.  
However, this choice presented its own ethical difficulties, for police 
recruits, although they lack any operational experience, are already 
police officers as defined by the BC Police Act — and they would have 
both a legal and ethical obligation to make arrests when they saw 
public disorder drug offences. 
 
I finally opted to use criminology students from a local university 
at which I teach, Kwantlen University College.  I presented this as a 
volunteer opportunity after I had finished teaching their course, so that 
my grading would have no influence on them.  Another advantage of 
using students, rather than relying solely on police reports and 
accounts, was the introduction of independent third parties into the 
analysis.  My research would not be voided by having a police 
researcher directly conduct field observations on the police. 
 
Much has been written about the difficulty of researching police 
work.  For example, the very nature of police work can complicate 
research: 
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Much policing is dangerous dirty work: getting people to do what 
they don’t want to do, or making them desist from doing what 
they want to do.  The tactics used for accomplishing this are 
almost inevitably going to be controversial even if they are legal, 
and they are frequently of dubious legality or clearly illegal 
(Reiner, 2000:218). 
 
Another difficulty in evaluating the police is the underreporting of 
minor incidents.  “[O]fficial police record substantially underreport, and 
perhaps distort, disorder problems” (Katz et al., 2001: 10), and police 
scholars maintain that this occurs largely because officers are more 
likely to handle such incidents informally (Black, 1980; Sherman, 1986; 
Skogan, 1990) in (Katz et al., 2001: 10).  Black’s observational study of 
police in Boston, Chicago, and Washington D.C. found that only about 
40% of minor complaints were recorded officially.  Moreover, “Many 
police scholars have recognized Calls for Service as a more reliable 
indicator of change in crime and disorder, particularly when examining 
place based police interventions (Green, 1995).  I considered simply 
examining calls for service however, there were several complicating 
factors using only that approach.  The main issue was that the CET 
was to be a highly visible police presence, as such officers were 
discouraged from making arrests and going off the street. In addition, 
many of the Vancouver Police stats are in a state of transition because 
of the implementation of a new police records management system, 
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PRIME.  This system requires officers to put more reports in on 
incidents that previously may have been simply resolved with no official 
report of the incident.  
 
To ensure a more accurate view of the DTES, I also considered 
triangulations (Research Methods: Module Three, 2001:1-17).  For this 
purpose, I originally decided to conduct both pre-CET and post-CET 
surveys of people in the DTES.  However, the Vancouver Police 
engaged an independent research company, Pollara, to conduct very 
similar post-CET surveys to my own, with much greater methodological 
means than I could bring to bear.  I will therefore discuss Pollara’s 
findings as a point of triangulation on the issues of public disorder in 
the DTES. 
 
Our first student walk occurred on March 27, 2003, this was a 
Thursday, one day after the social assistance checks have been given 
out.    Five students came to the main police building, at 312 Main 
Street in the core of the Downtown Eastside.  Three of the student’s 
were male and two of the students were female.  The males ranged in 
age from 24 to 40 years of age and the females ranged from 23 to 34.  
I had asked the students to dress appropriately for the area, by which I 
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meant neither too flashy nor too dressed down.  Sergeant Zannatta, 
Constable Ryley Swanson and I met the students in the station’s 
fourth-floor boardroom, where I took digital photographs to ensure that 
all five could wear the same or similar clothing on the second walk. 
 
Sergeant  Zannatta, who has many years of police experience 
including several on police surveillance teams, gave the students a 
safety briefing prior to their going on the street.   He specifically gave 
advice on how to walk in the area in order to mimic a drug user, and 
spoke of eye contact and the need to not focus on anyone.  In addition, 
he covered safety issues particular to the female students: violence by 
women against women, and the need for female researchers to be 
particularly cautious.  He then presented a cover story if the students 
were challenged: each should say they were looking for their sister in 
the area.  This is unfortunately is a common occurrence, family 
members coming into the Downtown Eastside to rescue or provide 
support for loved ones addicted to drugs.  Sergeant Zannatta also 
showed the students some of the weapons of choice in the Downtown 
Eastside, including firearms and knives, and gave a detailed account of 
radio procedures if an emergency situation occurred.  The student 
would be carrying a police radio; while running out of the area, they 
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should press the “push to talk” button and give an account of their 
exact location.  The briefing concluded by explaining common drug 
language such as “up,” (cocaine) “down,” (heroin) “Crack,” (rock 
cocaine) “You got,” (do you have drugs to sell, or do you have money 
to purchase drugs), tweaking (common in the DTES when someone is 
coming down from cocaine use they sometimes are searching the 
ground for small pieces of cocaine, it looks like a funny dance) and 
“looking to score (are you looking to purchase drugs).”  I fully 
appreciated that this kind of briefing could influence the students’ 
observations; however, I believe that the need for safety pre-empted 
any other consideration. 
 
Another choice which maximized the students’ safety was to 
have plainclothes police available to respond to any crisis the students 
encountered as they walked in the DTES.  The students would walk 
only on public streets, a choice which I believed would be least 
intrusive to the people they were observing, and which would thus 
provide the best results.  I recognized that the students might be 
anxious; however, I ensured their safety as best I could by having two 
armed police officers available to them at all times. 
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The plainclothes surveillance team would follow the students 
from some distance, yet would be in a position to reach them quickly if 
the need arose.  The unique subculture of the DTES is such that 
plainclothes police are almost immediately spotted, and identified by a 
system of whistling, yelling “5-0,“ or yelling “six” to alert all others on the 
street; consequently, the police were never in the same block as the 
students. 
 
I then began briefing the students on their research goals.  Each 
student received a copy of the survey definitions, so that they could 
take it on their walk to refer to if necessary.  Please refer to Appendix 
A. 
After asking the students if they had any questions about the 
definition of public disorder, I explained that they would each be given 
two clickers, one to carry in each pocket.  Walking with their hands in 
their pockets, they would simply click their observations with the 
appropriate hand.  The left hand would track drug use or drug 
approaches — the mnemonic was suggested of “L” for “Leave it alone” 
— while the right clicker would track any public disorder. 
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The students were told to leave the police station and head 
south along Main Street to Hastings Street.  They would proceed 
westbound on the north side of Hastings until they reached Cambie 
Street.  At Cambie Street they should cross to south side of Hastings 
Street, and then proceed eastbound on the south side of Hastings to 
Main Street, where they would enter the police station.  They were to 
spend about 45 minutes walking casually and slowly, stopping in 
places if they wanted, but under no circumstance to deviate from this 
route. 
 
The students were given the opportunity to change their minds if 
anyone felt uncomfortable with doing the observations.  None of the 
students did. 
 
Sergeant Zannatta placed a radio holster on the first student 
(hereafter referred to as “S1”), readying her to go, at 1845 hours; 
however, she was delayed while the Vancouver Police resolved a 
report of a man with a gun in the 100 block East Hastings.  At 1851 
hours, she departed with a cover team.  At 1859 hours, the cover team 
had to move in close to her because of a police call that a man had 
been stabbed in the head at a licensed premise in the area.  
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Nevertheless, S1 returned to the station at 1930 hours, having 
recorded 15 instances of public disorder and 12 drug uses or 
approaches.  S1 had been out for a total of 39 minutes. 
 
It became clear upon S1’s return to the station that she was 
quite frightened and concerned.  What had been planned only as 
quantitative research quickly became qualitative too, as S1 needed a 
debriefing interview in order to discuss the things that she had seen.  
The results of that interview are at Appendix B.  
 
The second student, S2, left the station at 1933 hours and 
returned at 2005 hours.  S2 had recorded 1 instance of public disorder 
and 28 drug uses or approaches over 32 minutes of observations.  
Once again I interviewed S2, the results of that interview are at 
Appendix C. 
 
The third student, S3, left at 2006 hours and returned at 2045 
hours, recording 5 instances of public disorder and 15 drug uses or 
approaches in 39 minutes.  S3’s comments are at Appendix D. 
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The fourth student, S4, left at 2048 hours but soon returned, 
having forgotten the clickers.  S4 left again at 2055 hours and returned 
at 2133 hours, having recorded 102 instances of public disorder and 35 
drug uses or approaches in 38 minutes.  S4 interview comments are at 
Appendix E. 
 
The fifth student, S5, left at 2135 hours and returned at 2200 
hours, having recorded 19 instances of public disorder and 25 drug 
uses or approaches in 25 minutes.  It should be noted that over the 
course of the evening, four armed robberies had occurred in a police 
district several miles away from the DTES.  While S5 was out, the 
police arrested the robbery suspect in the 100 block East Hastings.  
This event gives some credence to the Rational Choice Theory 
concept that the Downtown Eastside is a one-stop shop for criminals. 
 
Having been involved in some other research for the VPD, S5 
was less traumatized by the walkaround than the other students.  
Nevertheless, S5 had never been in the area without a uniformed 
police officer alongside.  S5 interview comments are at Appendix F. 
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     Through the evening, the students made observations for a 
total of 174 minutes.  During the same period, the DTES saw three 
serious priority police calls: the man with the gun, the man stabbed in 
the head, and the arrest of the robbery suspect.  It should be noted 
also that this night was a cold, dark night.  Of note also is that the 
social assistance cheques had been given out the day before the 
observations, which traditionally results in a higher sense of disorder 
and call load in the Downtown Eastside.  The students recorded a total 
of 268 incidents of public disorder, drug use, and/or drug approaches in 
174 minutes, which works out to one incident every 39 seconds. 
 
These observations provided a baseline for the level of public 
disorder in the DTES prior to the implementation of the CET. 
 
On April 4, 2003 I attended the Citywide Enforcement Team 
planning meeting, which was held at a venue outside the City of 
Vancouver.  Before the meeting started, I surveyed the officers in the 
room that had been assigned to the DTES in the previous 60 days.  
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Two students had also arranged to conduct the same survey on 
service providers in the DTES.  The return rate for the survey was very 
poor, and as such I have decided to exclude it from the research.   
Chief Constable Jamie Graham began the CET meeting by speaking 
about his vision for the DTES, and the need to restore order to a 
community in crisis.  He thanked the officers for the sacrifices they had 
been called upon to make, and stressed the VPD Senior Management 
Team’s commitment to this project. 
 
Inspector Bob Rich, the District Commander for District Two, 
and Inspector Doug Lepard, Inspector in charge of CET, next spoke 
about their goals for the project.  Both of them stressed the need to do 
something proactive about the DTES, even if it was not guaranteed to 
work.  They also encouraged team members to be proactive and 
professional with drug traffickers.  The Inspectors were clear that any 
unprofessional performance by police members would not be tolerated.  
Searches should be conducted when appropriate and arrest made 
when there was the requisite grounds to arrest.   In addition they spoke 
about the tragedy and hardship of drug addiction and encouraged 
police members to be firm but to remain empathetic towards drug 
users. 
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This set the day’s tone, and other speakers carried the same 
message through their material.  A representative from the Coastal 
Health Authority provided an easy-to-understand notebook card which 
police officers could carry, describing what health resources were 
available for drug users.  Sergeant Milligan from the Internal 
Investigation Section spoke about professional conduct and the 
department’s expectations of members while conducting their duties.  
He also led a brief discussion of verbal communication skills for dealing 
with difficult people.  The Police Department’s media people spoke 
about the intense media attention that would be drawn to the area 
because of the polarization of the issues.  Some people in the 
community saw the CET as an attack on the poor, while others 
believed CET would force drug users into more dangerous situations.  
The police believe that in order for supervised injection sites to work a 
baseline of consequence needed to be set for open air drug use, 
otherwise their would be no incentive for drug users to walk to the 
supervised injection sites.   
 
Finally, Sergeant Zannatta outlined various tactics and facilitated 
a discussion of strategy.  Once again it was reiterated that a completely 
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zero tolerance approach was not being taken. Police officers were 
discouraged from making arrests for possession of controlled drugs.  
Instead, officers should encourage public users of illicit substances to 
be more discreet, and reeducate the users about the new rules of not 
using drugs on the street.  However, the officers were encouraged to 
take a Zero Tolerance approach to drug traffickers, and moreover were 
advised that their first few days on the street would be very busy 
because of the culmination of Project Torpedo.  Warrants for the arrest 
of traffickers who had sold to undercover police operators would be 
issued on the first day of the CET. 
 
The CET officially began on April 5, 2003 at 0700 hours.  Four 
squads of a Sergeant and 14 Constables each were created to provide 
20 hours per day coverage, every day of the week.  At any time during 
the hours of 0700 to 0300 there would be at least 15 police officers on 
foot in the DTES.  Their mandate, an extension of Project Seinfeld, was 
simply to be a presence, assuming turf ownership of a single block for 
every two partners.  Officers would discourage disorder and crime by 
their sheer presence. 
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In order to create an intense police presence, various other 
areas of the Police Department supplied officers on a rotating basis for 
foot patrol in the DTES.  Detectives and even senior managers put on 
a uniform for a day, walking the beat.  Moreover, traffic enforcement, 
the Emergency Response Team, and the Mounted Squad were all 
detailed to spend their non-deployed time in the DTES. 
 
On May 29, 2003, sixty-three days after the previous student 
walk, we met again to perform more field observations.   This date was 
chosen because it was the day after the social assistance checks were 
handed out.  Further the weather on this date was warm and clear.  
The observations made by the students were made in lighter 
conditions, as sunset was later than the previous walkaround.  This 
would test whether the introduction of the CET into the DTES has had 
an impact on public disorder and crime. 
 
Sergeant Zannatta and Police Constable Andy Russell agreed 
to provide cover teams for the students.  The students, who had been 
asked to dress identically or similarly to their outfits on the first walk, 
received a quick refresher briefing, covering safety, street language, 
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the use of the clickers, and the definitions of public disorder.  The 
students traveled the same route as the first walkaround.   
 
S5 had other commitments later in the evening, and requested 
to go first.  S5 left the police station at 1743 hours and returned at 1811 
hours, for a total of 28 minutes of observations.  S5 recorded 5 
instances of public disorder and 8 drug uses or approaches.  S5 
interview comments are at Appendix G. 
 
S2 left at 1815 hours and returned at 1848 hours, a total of 33 
minutes.  S2 recorded 6 instances of public disorder and 5 drug uses 
or approaches.  S2 comments are recorded at Appendix H.  
 
S1 left at 1850 hours and returned at 1924 hours, recording 7 
instances of public disorder and 1 drug use or approach in a total of 34 
minutes of observations.  S1 interview comments are at Appendix I. 
 
S4 left at 1932 hours and returned at 2016 hours, a total of 44 
minutes of observations, recording 6 instances of public disorder and 2 
drug uses or approaches.  S4 interview comments are at Appendix J. 
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S3 left at 2021 hours and returned at 2102 hours, for a total of 
41 minutes of observations.  S3 recorded 6 instances of public disorder 
and 5 drug uses or approaches.  S3 Comments are at Appendix K.  
 
The students observed a total of 53 incidents of public disorder, 
drug uses, or drug approaches in 180 minutes of observations.  This 
works out to one incident every 203 seconds, which is just over 3 and 
1/3 minutes. 
 
Having considered the current academic debates about whether 
police matter, and also having discussed the methodology of the 
current study, we must now consider the value of this research — for it 
is not exhaustive, nor should any concrete positions be taken because 
of it.  I would, however, suggest that the experiences of student 
observers in the DTES, both pre-CET and post CET, indicate that 
police efforts have made a positive change in the arena of public 
disorder.  I will discuss this later in more detail, but first let us 
triangulate the study by looking at some pertinent survey results. 
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Because time and resources were lacking, and the return rate 
was minimal, I abandoned my own initial survey of police and other 
service providers.  I also abandoned my planned follow-up survey upon 
learning that the Vancouver Police Department had engaged an 
independent research firm, Pollara, to carry out very similar research 
with much greater means.  The one conclusion I will draw from the 
initial survey results is that prior to the CET, police officers 
overwhelmingly held the belief that they could have an impact on crime 
and disorder in the DTES.  The information received from Pollara 
supports this belief. 
 
Pollara conducted a total of 708 interviews between June 6, 
2003 and June 10, 2003, eight weeks after the CET began.  Of these 
interviews, 202 were conducted with residents of the DTES, while 506 
other Vancouver residents were surveyed.  The research found that 
83% of DTES residents had noticed an increased police presence (A 
Pollara Report for the Vancouver Police Department 
Opinions of Residents and Businesses Regarding the City-wide 
Enforcement Team Project, 2003:2).    Moreover, 63% of DTES 
businesses, 62% of DTES residents and 58% of Vancouver residents 
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believed that the CET had had an impact on restoring order in the 
DTES (A Pollara Report for the Vancouver Police Department 
Opinions of Residents and Businesses Regarding the City-wide 
Enforcement Team Project, 2003:3).    In addition, 85% of DTES 
residents said they would support the continuation of the CET (A 
Pollara Report for the Vancouver Police Department 
Opinions of Residents and Businesses Regarding the City-wide 
Enforcement Team Project, 2003:4)).  The level of support was 
particularly high from disadvantaged, low-income residents of the 
DTES, whose strong support for the police efforts belies some of the 
media coverage that the police were being heavy-handed or excessive. 
 
Of my own findings, the students’ comments are as telling as 
the actual quantitative research.  One can read from them that the first, 
pre-CET walkaround was a traumatic experience for most of the 
students.  Despite the knowledge that they were conducting an 
experiment, with two dedicated police officers nearby for their 
assistance, they found the DTES a scary place to be.  What, then, 
must have been the experience for tourists and others who visited the 
DTES?  Should the city continue to allow such conditions of disorder, 
crime and fear to exist?  Further, what are the costs of public safety 
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compared to the cost of lost future income from tourists who don’t 
return to the city?  How many out-of-province vehicles must be broken 
into before Vancouver gets a bad reputation for crime? 
Considering the students’ comments is particularly illuminating 
upon comparing the first walk to the second.  Consider S1 who on the 
first walk stated, “I didn’t feel safe in the area,” to the second walk, “I 
was way more relaxed: there was so many police.”  Furthermore, the 
large crowds that this student had previously found intimidating were 
no longer present.  I believe this shows that the level of public disorder 
in the area has also decreased. 
 
S2 described her experience of the first walk as “scared and 
intimidated”.  Just 60 days later, the second walk is described as 
“pleasant, cleaner, and not intimidating”.  S2, like S1, commented on 
the number of police, illustrating once again how the introduction of 
additional police to the area has affected the fear of disorder and crime. 
 
Once again, S3 describes on the first walk observations of 
“large groups of people on the street openly doing drugs”.  On the 
second walk he describes it as “a lot more comfortable.”  Without large 
groups, “I did not have any concerns for my safety.”  Once more this 
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bears out how the perception of fear has improved, as a direct result of 
more police presence and less public disorder. 
 
          S4 stated that making observations on the first walk is described 
as difficult, because so much was going on.  On the second walk, his 
observations are often alcohol-related, an issue which has always 
existed in the DTES.  Nonetheless S4 still describes the experience as 
“a lot safer, partially because it was daylight, and also because of the 
number of cops, they seemed to be everywhere.”  Once again we see 
that the mere presence of police in the area has had an impact on the 
level of disorder. 
 
The observations made by S5 have to be considered in a 
slightly different light from those of the first four students.  S5 made 
fewer observations than the others on his first walkaround, but while he 
was out, the Vancouver Police made a highly visible arrest of an armed 
robbery suspect.  This type of incident, during which several of the 
officers pointed firearms at the suspect, can of itself affect the level of 
disorder in the area.  S5 does comment that after the police had left, 
the crowd began to form again.  In his second walk, S5 says that he 
saw fewer people and that the street did not seem as crazy.  Those 
  90 
unfamiliar with the DTES may consider the time of day or lighting a 
significant consideration or variable, however, the DTES has always 
been busy with public disorder and crime at all hours of the day.  
 
The quantitative research also shows the difference between 
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The students’ observations and comments have shown that the 
police can have an impact on disorder and crime.  Admittedly, all of the 
students still described incidents of public disorder, drug uses, and/or 
drug approaches on the second walk, but its frequency was not nearly 
so high.  The CET is not expected to eradicate all public disorder in the 
DTES.  The DTES may always have more crime and disorder than 
other Vancouver neighborhoods, but at least with the introduction of 
CET the level has become manageable.  Though citizens may still 
consider the DTES to be a rougher than normal part of town, it is no 
longer out of control.  With continued support, and commitment of time 
and resources in a considered balance between Situational Crime 
Prevention, Broken Windows Theory and enhancement of resources to 
treat root causes of crime, it may be possible for the DTES to become 
once again a prosperous, safe and thriving community. 
 
I must also concede a degree of displacement of the problem.  
Although, space limitations do not allow for much discussion of 
displacement in this paper, the police have found that some people 
have moved their drug operations to other parts of the city.  Cathedral 
Square, Granville Mall and the Commercial Drive area have all seen 
slight increases in public disorder.  Other cities in Greater Vancouver, 
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such as Surrey and New Westminster, have also shown some 
increases. 
 
Some police officers believe from these data that the CET has 
failed — that the problems have simply moved.  I firmly disagree.  
Although the problems of drug addiction, public disorder, and crime 
associated with supporting drug habits will never be eradicated by 
simply adding more police to an area, the placement of those police 
must ensure that the levels of public disorder are manageable.  People 
will put up with some public disorder as a necessary evil of urban life, 
but they will not be so tolerant when it becomes severe enough to have 
a significant impact on their lives.  The people of New York City elected 
Rudy Giuliani as Mayor in November of 1993, on a platform of being 
fed up with the sheer amount of public disorder in their streets.  It is this 
constant public disorder that makes a city appear unsafe.  Smaller 
pockets of public disorder may be irritants, but people tend to adjust to 
them.  Prior to CET, the DTES was simply a place that most citizens 
avoided because of the prolific and open drug use. 
 
The CET, in adopting the principles of Problem-Oriented 
Policing and intelligence-led policing, could vastly improve the safety of 
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all citizens in Vancouver, not just of those of the DTES.  The police 
must continue in their efforts in the DTES, but when the time comes — 
and it will — that other areas have started to present a significant 
problem, then a redeployment of CET can have the same impact.  This 
constant moving of the CET will affect overall crime levels, because it 
takes time for the criminal element to get established in a new area.   
The criminals must adjust to their new environment and learn the 
geography of the area, and police apprehensions will be easier.  If the 
CET can keep these people constantly in flux, eventually their criminal 
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C h a p t e r  F i v e  -  C o n c l u s i o n s  
The ongoing debate about the value of the police and can they 
make a difference through order maintenance approaches to crime 
control is both dynamic and in its infancy.  The debates continue 
between Harcourt and Kelling et al about the true causes of the 
decreases inc rime in New York City.  After CET was announced in 
Vancouver both Harcourt and Wilson were contacted by local media to 
give their spin on the projected outcomes.  The research conducted 
here does add to the debates.  Primarily the addition is in taking some 
of the conclusions that Harcourt made about the successes in New 
York City and applying them to the Vancouver successes and being 
able to differentiate between what occurred in Vancouver and what 
occurred in New York City recognizing that other places had a 
reduction in crime.   
The research provides additional information for the debate and 
some of the findings add to the proponents of broken windows and 
some of the finding adds to the evidence of the detractors of Broken 
Windows.  In summary of the material from Chapter Two, Harcourt 
claims that there is no empirical evidence to support the Broken 
Windows Theory (Harcourt, 2001: 57).  Skogan and Keeling disagree 
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and believe that the study conducted by Skogan shows that crime and 
disorder are linked- and that this has been empirically validated (G. 
Kelling & Coles, 1996: 24).  Essentially Kelling, Skogan and Wilson 
argue that the rate of serious crime is directly related to the level of 
disorder in a community.  In Slogan’s study he measured the rate of  
robbery as the crime indicator and found that in neighborhoods with 
increased disorder, crime (robbery) was higher.  Harcourt has 
attempted to replicate those findings and is very critical because of 
Skogans data collection and manipulation.    Harcourt does not believe 
that serious crime and disorder are related.   
Harcourt further believes that the primary reason for the 
reduction in New York’s crime rate was because of increased police 
surveillance, and policies of aggressive stop and search, and arrest 
(Harcourt, 2001: 100).  In addition, Harcourt believes that the increased 
size of the police force, shifting drug use patterns, new computerized 
tracking systems and demographics all played a role in the reduction of 
crime(Harcourt, 2001: 103).  Explicitly, Harcourt rejects the Broken 
Windows Theory espoused by Kelling et al.  The research conducted 
on the DTES provides some evidence that disputes Harcourts claims 
about the reduction in crime in New York City.  The first consideration 
is that the officers assigned to the DTES were not instructed to take a 
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zero tolerance approach to drug use.  They were instructed to take a 
zero tolerance approach to other types of crime and disorder.  Simply 
their presence and the issuing of violation tickets was used to minimize 
the disorder in the area.   
Further, the officers assigned to CET were unable to simply do 
stop and searches or aggressive tactics as suggested by Harcourt to 
be an imperative ingredient to the success of the NYPD in New York.   
Canadian law does not allow for such stops by police on mere 
suspicion.  This makes this current research important because it is 
conducted within the Canadian content and it provides some evidence 
to discount Harcourt claim that crime can only be reduced if police 
resort to excesses in the law.    The Canadian Charter of Rights and 
Freedoms contains protections for citizens that denies the police the 
latitude to make arbitrary stop and searches like in other countries.    
This research appears to be the first of its kind conducted on Broken 
Windows Theory in a Canadian context.  Canada has different laws 
than the United Kingdom, Australia and the United States.  In 
particular, Canada has an emphasis in its criminal justice system for 
human rights protections.  The methods utilized in New York City with 
its application of city ordinances, and in England of stop and search 
provisions under PACE cannot be used in Canada.  Police in Canada 
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can only legally detain someone if they have articulable cause to 
believe they have been involved in a crime.  The CET were able to 
have an impact on crime and disorder even with some of the restrictive 
police powers that do not exist in other countries.  The sheer prolonged 
presence of police in the DTES made the disorder minimize.   The fact 
that CET had the impact on crime and disorder, and that it did without 
the aggressive methods that Harcourt suggested was part of the 
reason for New Yorks successes provides some evidence which 
weakens Harcourts position.  If the police were able to reduce crime 
and disorder through there sheer presence (capable guardians) then 
maybe the opportunity theorist have more reliability.    
In addition, Harcourt might argue that the CET used powers to 
search people for very minor offences.  This brings us to another 
criticism of Harcourt work.  Harcourt appears to consistently be critical 
of the police involving themselves in minor or in his mind non-
consequential crimes.  In his book, Illusion of Order, he suggests this in 
several places and this weakens his credibility.   In Harcourt’s slant the 
laws that deal with drunks, panhandlers and squeegee people are in 
place to give the police the power to remove these people from the 
street in order to restore order (Harcourt, 2001:128).  Harcourt 
minimizes the impacts or seriousness of these public order crimes in 
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the community.  In fact, Harcourt appeals to the reader and suggests 
that we have all been guilty of some of these minor public order 
offences (Harcourt, 2001: 130).   Irrespective of Broken Windows 
Theory all of these minor public order offences have consequences for 
the community and the individual offender.  If the police did not have 
the ability to arrest drunks on the street, many more alcoholic street 
people would die due to exposure or drunkenness.  Further the 
panhandler or the squeegee washer who is able to survive resorting to 
such activities to support themselves is unlikely to connect with proper 
social housing or services which may impact on their quality of life.  
Furthermore, the presence of semi-concious drunks on the street, 
squeegee people and panhandler does impact on peoples perception 
of safety. 
Another discrepancy found in the research on the DTES is 
Harcourts believe that the crime rate in New York decreased because 
of an increase in arrests.  The CET made a total of 1207 arrests 
between April 2003 and June 2003, however these arrests have been 
continually declining for a total reduction of 22% from the inception of 
CET (Prox, 2003b:3).  Therefore CET is now making less arrests, 
however, public order has continued to increase as the crime rate has 
decreased within the DTES.   
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A weakness of these studies of disorder and crime is the 
definitions of disorder.  I too have this as weakness in my research 
because regrettably I used definitions of disorder that in of themselves 
also constituted crimes.  Consequently, if disorder decreased, so then 
did crime.  For my study disorder was defined as fights, assaults, 
breaches of the peace, mischief, disturbances, drug use or drug 
approaches.  All of these types of behaviors are in of themselves 
crimes.   
In reviewing Skogan’s definitions of social disorder one finds a 
similarity in his definitions of disorder to mine.  He too defines acts of 
disorder that are also crimes, albeit crimes of minimal consequence.  
Skogan refers to social disorder as public drinking, prostitution, sexual 
harassment, and vandalism which by Canadian law are all sanctioned 
by criminal or quasi criminal law.  Further, Skogan’s physical disorder 
abandoned or ill kept buildings, broken streetlights, trash-filled lots and 
alleys strewn with garbage (Skogan, 1990: 4) are all regulated under 
municipal by-laws.  In essence the definition of disorder that I used in 
the study of the CET and DTES has done is not so much added 
directly to the broken windows debate.  If one was to truly be testing 
this theory then I should have had the students simply record incidents 
of public disorder that were not also crimes.  This issue is consistent 
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with the disorder that Kelling, Skogan, and Wilson use in their research.  
The disorder they use is also crime albeit minor in nature.  Then if one 
accepts this, the question is can police impact on crime or the 
perception or fear of crime.   
 
 In my study of the Broken Windows Theory in the Downtown 
Eastside I conclude that the introduction of additional police officers 
assigned to specific blocks, with a mandate to minimize disorder by 
their constant presence in that block has resulted in a decrease in 
disorder and crime.  This conclusion is based on the following three 
pieces of research, one, the students observations during the two 
walkalongs, two, the Pollara study of various residents of the DTES 
and their perceptions about community safety, and finally based on the 
analysis of the crime data completed by Prox.   
 
The student walkalongs research used observational methods 
and concluded that after 63 days and the introduction of CET into the 
DTES that there was an 80% reduction in observed incidents of 
disorder/crime.  The presence of the CET had impacted on the 
neighborhood and where before there was chaos now there was 
calmness. 
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Considering the work of the Pollara group in making my 
conclusions, one must consider that 63% of DTES businesses, 62% of 
DTES residents and 58% of Vancouver residents believe that CET has 
had an impact on restoring order in the DTES.  Further 51% of DTES 
businesses, 45% of DTES residents and 50% of Vancouver residents 
believe that the DTES is safer now because of CET (A Pollara Report 
for the Vancouver Police Department Opinions of Residents and 
Businesses Regarding the City-wide Enforcement Team Project, 2003: 
3).  The above survey results provide evidence that the CET has had 
an impact on the perception of disorder and safety amongst the people 
of Vancouver.  This is further compelling independent evidence that 
supports the belief that police do matter and attacking pulic disorder 
can reduce crime or fear of it. 
 
Finally an analysis of the CET statistical package prepared by 
Special Constable Ryan Prox is further illustrative of the impact that 
CET has had on the level of disorder and crime in the DTES.  The 
DTES has experienced a further decrease of 11% in overall crime in 
the month of July 2003 from July 2002.  The total amount of reported 
crime since CET began in April 2003 to July 2003 compared to the 
same period in 2002 is a drop of 8% (Prox, 2003b: 3).  Specifically 
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related to violent crime, homicide is down 50% compared to July 2002, 
albeit a change from 2 homicides in 2002 to 1 in 2003.  Further, 
robberies are down by 21% from the previous July.  Of note the rate of 
assaults in the DTES is slightly up by 3% however the entire City of 
Vancouver is up by 6% (Prox, 2003b: 3). 
 
In the area of property crime there are some mixed results.  
Burglaries are up by 27% and thefts are up by 13% in the DTES, while 
theft from autos is down 43% and theft of autos is down by 41% (Prox, 
2003b: 3).  Not withstanding some increases in property crime in the 
area of burglaries and thefts these crime reduction still provide 
evidence that the CET and its reduction in disorder is also impacting on 
the level of crime.   
 
Considering some of the other relevant academic debates such 
as, Rational Choice Theory, Routine Activity Theory and Situational 
Crime Prevention Theory suggest that the opportunity to commit crime 
is of primary focus in creating environments that deter offenders.  Prior 
to the introduction of the CET into the DTES there were very few 
capable guardian and the presence of drug traffickers made the area 
very easy to commit criminal acts.  The CET has increased the number 
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of capable guardians and has also decreased the rewards for 
committing crime.  The sheer presence of the police combined with an 
ability to arrest people for actions that previously would go untouched 
for has promoted a belief amongst the people of the DTES that the 
police can make a difference.  Public disorder now results in 
consequence where before it rarely did. 
 
In following with Wangs research on robberies by street gangs 
and his conclusions that offenders weigh the cost of and benefits of 
committing crime.  It is apparent from the decrease in open drug use in 
the DTES that by introducing the CET, that drug users and dealers 
have made a rational choice to move, go inside, or to not go to the 
DTES in the first place.  Like Wang, this researcher does not believe 
that the drug users in the DTES have miraculously cured their 
addiction, they simply have completed a cost benefit analysis and 
recognize with a police officer in every block the open use of drugs will 
result in drug seizures and possibly arrest.  The CET has changed the 
equation of cost analysis which prior to its implementation invariably 
won out as a good risk. 
 
  104 
Further following in the work of Cornish and Clarke that the 
criminal commits the crime because the opportunity presents itself, the 
Mardi Gras, anything goes atmosphere of the DTES prior to the 
implementation of the CET created an environment where people saw 
ample opportunity to commit crime, public disorder with minimal 
consequence.  The same behavior in other parts of Vancouver or in the 
surrounding communities would result in police enforcement.   
 
Continuing where Exum’s study concluded that people under 
the influence of alcohol are not necessarily able to make rational 
choices, the research in the DTES adds to that discussion.  The drug 
users of the DTES did not quit using drugs with the introduction of 
CET.  The users made rational choices about where and when to use 
those drugs.  Displacement did occur into hotel rooms and hallways, 
out of the public view.  This change in venue for drug use shows a 
rational choice because drug users did not want to have their drugs 
seized by the police. 
 
 In addition this research adds to the current research that has 
concluded that proactive policing methods do impact on crime and 
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disorder (Bratton & Knobler, 1998; Katz et al., 2001; Sherman & 
Weisburd, 1995; Weiss & Freels, 1996; J.Q. Wilson & Boland, 1978).   
 
In considering Situational Crime Prevention Theory this 
research into the DTES has added to its debates in that the CET 
introduction into the DTES has reduced the opportunities for crime by 
the constant presence of the police.  The CET has had an impact on 
the opportunity for rewards for crime in the DTES.  In comparing the 
number of customers, items pawned, and dollar value since the 
inceptoion of the CET one sees a clear decrease.  In comparing just 
two one week periods, March 13th to 19th 2003, (prior to CET) and May 
22nd to May 28th, 2003 (CET) significant reductions have been made.   
There has been a 16% reduction in customers, 16% in items pawned, 
and 29% reduction dollar value of items pawned from 168,076.17 
dollars in March to 119, 661.81 in May (Prox, 2003b: 23).   
 
Further related to situational crime prevention Prox believes that 
there has been displacement but because this displacement has made 
the crime cycle geographically larger this requires longer periods 
between crimes because it now takes longer to pawn, purchase drugs 
and then use drugs. 
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Ultimately the research into the DTES did not consider root 
causes of crime.  This lack of consideration was deliberate because in 
absence of “street rules” and consequences the DTES cannot begin to 
tackle root causes through therapy, rehabilitation or supervised 
injection sites. 
 
On September 15, 2003 the City of Vancouver opened the first 
“Safe Injection Site’ in North America.  The harm reduction policies that 
the Canadian government, Federal, Provincial and Municipal are 
undertaking are in place to try and reduce the number of people dying 
from overdoses and the cost of drug addiction.  The CET had to be put 
into the DTES to establish a basis of order otherwise well intentioned 
drug addicts would be running the gauntlet of drug dealers and users.  
The commitment that the Vancouver Police and in particular the 
officers assigned to CET is a true community police initiative.  The 
people of the DTES form a community in crisis and the police in 
partnership with that community are working towards finding solutions 
to bring about a safer environment for all people who reside in the 
DTES.   
 
  107 
Furthermore the Vancouver Police in recognizing both the 
results of this research, additional anecdotal research and the research 
conducted by Pollara have committed to not giving up what they have 
gained.  The Vancouver Police will be continuing the CET project and 
though it was initially only proposed as a 90 day pilot project it was 
recently approved by the Chief Constable to continue indefinitely in a 
similar form. 
 
In closing the DTES is a community in crisis.  The Vancouver 
Police have recognized the principles of the various academic theories 
and have blended them into a strategy to restore order in the DTES.  
Continued efforts by the community, the police, the government should 
make the turn from past fatalistic policy.  Further with the introduction of 








  108 
C h a p t e r  T w o -  W o r k s  C i t e d  
 
Ballard, J. Big Apple's Crime Fighter Gives Lessons on Core Policing. 
 
Bottoms, A. E., & Wiles, P. (Eds.). (1997). Environmental Criminology. 
Oxford: Clarendon Press. 
 
Bowling, B. (1999). The rise and fall of New York murder: Zero 
tolerance or crack's decline? The British Journal of Criminology, 
39(4), 531-554. 
 
Braga, A., Weisburd, D., Waring, E., Green-Mazerolle, L., Spelman, 
W., & Gajewski, G. (1999). Problem-Oriented Policing Places: A 
Randomized Control Experiment. Criminology, 37, 541-579. 
 
Bratton, B., & Giuliani, R. (1994). Police Strategy No. 5: Reclaiming the 
Public Spaces of New York (Policy Document). New York: City 
of New York Police Department. 
 
Bratton, B., & Knobler, P. (1998). Turnaround. New York: Random 
House. 
 
Brunet, J. R. (2002). Discouragement of Crime Through Civil 
Remedies: An Application of a Reformulated Routine Activities 
Theory. Western Criminology Review, 4(1), 68-79. 
 
Clarke, R. V. (1980). Situational Crime Prevention. British Journal of 
Criminology, 20(2), 136-147. 
 
Dennis, N., & Mallon, R. (1997). Confident Policing in Hartlepool. In N. 
Dennis (Ed.), Zero Tolerance: Policing a Free Society (pp. 62-
87). London: Institute of Economic Affairs. 
 
DesChamps, S., Brantingham, P. L., & Brantingham, P. J. (1994). The 
British Columbia transit fare evasion. In R. Clarke (Ed.), 
Situational Crime Prevention: Successful Case Studies. Albany: 
Harrow and Heston. 
 
  109 
Exum, M. L. (2002). The Application and "Robustness of the Rational 
Choice Perspective in the Study of Intoxicated and Angry 
intentions to Aggress. Criminology, 40(4), 933-966. 
 
Felson, M., & Clarke, R. V. (1998). Opportunity Makes the Thief 
Practical Theory for Crime Prevention. London. 
 
Harcourt, B. E. (2001). Illusion of OrderThe False Promise of Broken 
Windows Policing. 
Homel, R., & Clark, J. (1994). The Prediction and Prevention of 
Violence in Pubs and CLubs. In R. V. Clarke (Ed.), Crime 
Prevention Studies. Monsey, New York: Willow Tree Press Inc. 
 
Jamison, R. (2002). Shattering "Broken Windows": An Analysis of San 
Francisco's Alternative Crime Policies. Retrieved March 04, 
2003, 2003, from 
http://www.cjcj.org/pubs/windows/windows.html 
 
Johnson, B., Golup, A., & Dunlap, E. (Eds.). (2000). The Rise and 
Decline of Hard Drugs, Drug Markets, and Violence in Inner City 
New York. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
 
Katz, C. M., Webb, V. J., & Schaefer, D. R. (2001). An assessment of 
the impact of quality-of-life poliicng on crime and disorder. 
Justice Quarterly, 18(4), 825-876. 
 
Keel, R. (1997). Rational Choice and Deterrence Theory. Retrieved 
May 9, 2003, from http://www.umsl.edu/~rkeel/200/ratchoc.html 
 
Kelling, G. L., & Coles, C. M. (1996). Fixing broken windows : restoring 
order and reducing crime in our communities. New York: Martin 
Kessler Books. 
 
Kelling, G. L., & National Institute of Justice (U.S.). (1999). "Broken 
windows" and police discretion. Washington, DC: U.S. Dept. of 
Justice Office of Justice Programs National Institute of Justice. 
 
Kelling, G. L., & Sousa, W. H. (2001). Do Police Matter? An Analysis of 
the impact of New York City's Police Reforms. New York: Centre 
for Civic Innovation at the Manhattan Institute. 
 
  110 
LaFree, G. (1998). Social Institutions and the Crime Bust. Journal of 
Criminal Law and Criminology, 88(4), 1325-1368. 
 




Mathew, P., Clarke, R. V., Sturman, A., & Hough, J. M. (1976). Crime 
as Opportunity. London: HMSO. 
 
Mathews, R. (1993). Kerb-Crawling, Prostitution and Multi-Agency 
Policing. London: Home Office Police Research Group. 
 
McCarthy, B. (2002). New Economics of Sociological Criminology. 
Annual Sociology Review, 28(1), 417-442. 
 
McCarthy, B., & Hagan, J. (2001). When crime pays: capital, 
competence and criminal success. Social Forces, 79, 1035-
1059. 
 
Nagin, D. S., & Paternoster, R. (1993). Enduring individual differences 
and rational choice theories of crime. Law and Society Review, 
27(3), 467. 
 
Novak, K., Hartman, J., Holsinger, A., & Turner, M. (1999). The Effects 
of Aggressive Policing of Disorder and Serious Crime. Policing, 
22, 171-190. 
 
Reuter P, M. P., Murphy P. (1990). In RAND (Ed.), Money from Crime: 
A study of the Economics of Drug Dealing in Washington, DC. 
Santa Monica. 
 
Rimensnyder, S. (2001, November 2001). Broken Theory. Reason, 33, 
17. 
 
Skogan, W. (1990). Disorder and Decline. Free Press. 
 
Taylor, I. (1997). The Political Economy of Crime. In M. Macguire, 
Morgan, Rod and Reiner, Robert (Ed.), The Oxford Handbook of 
Criminology (Vol. Second Edition, pp. 265-303). Oxford: Oxford 
University Press. 
  111 
 
Wang, J. Z. (2002). Bank Robberies by an Asian Gang: An 
Assessment of the Routine Activities Theory. International 
Journal of Offender Therapy and Comparative Criminology, 
46(5), 555-568. 
 
Wilson, J. Q., & Kelling, G. L. Broken Windows The police and 
neighborhood safety. 
 































  112 
C h a p t e r  T h r e e -  W o r k  C i t e d  
 
About Vancouver. Retrieved August 11, 2003, from 
http://www.city.vancouver.bc.ca/aboutvan.htm 
 
An Alcohol and Drug Action Plan for the Downtown 
Eastside/Strathcona 
Draft Plan. (2001). Vancouver: Community Directions. 
 
Bula, F. (2003, 11June2003). Mayor reacts angrily to report on 
Downtown Eastside drug crackdown. Vancouver Sun. 
 
Campbell, L. W. (2003). Confronting Poverty and Addiction on 
Vancouver's Downtown Eastside. Vancouver. 
 




Downtown Eastside Revitalization. Retrieved August 11, 2003, from 
http://www.city.vancouver.bc.ca 
 
Knight, L. (2003, 11June2003). Line blurs between skids and Gastown. 
North Shore News. 
 
MacPherson, D. (2000). A Four Pillar Approach to Drug Problems in 
Vancouver. Vancouver. 
 
Prox, R. (2003). Citywide Enforcement Benchmark Evaluation. 
Vancouver: Vancouver Police. 
 
Rayment, M. (2003). Seinfeld CAD Data. Vancouver: Vancouver 
Police. 
 
Thompson, H. (2003). Vancouver Ready for Safe Injection Sites, Says 




  113 
Vancouver Injection Drug Users Survey. (2000). Vancouver. 
 
Vancouver Police Board: Minutes of the regular meeting. 
(Minutes)(2003). Vancouver: Vancouver Police Board. 
 
Wickstead, G., Parks, J., & Bradley, G. (2003). Treadmill of Addiction: 
A Snapshot of the Enforcement Pillar in Vancouver's Downtown 
















  114 
C h a p t e r  F o u r -  W o r k s  C i t e d  
 
 
Black, D. (1980). The Manners and Customs of the Police. Academic 
Press.  Brown, J. (1996). Police Research: Some Critical Issues. In F. 
Leishman, B. Loveday & S. Savage (Eds.), Core Issues in Poliicng. 
London: Longman.  [Green, L. (1995). Cleaning up Drug Spots in 
Oakland, California:  The Displacement and Diffusion Effects. Justice 
Quarterly, 12(737-754). 
 
Katz, C. M., Webb, V. J., & Schaefer, D. R. (2001). An assessment of 
the impact of quality-of-life policing on crime and disorder. Justice 
Quarterly, 18(4), 825-876. 
 
A Pollara Report for the Vancouver Police Department: Opinions of 
Residents and Businesses Regarding the City-wide 
Enforcement Team Project. (2003). Vancouver: Pollara. 
 
Reiner, R. (Ed.). (2000). Police Research. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press. 
  115 
Research Methods: Module Three. (2001). Leicester: Scarman Centre-
University of Leicester. 
 
Sherman, L. (1986). Policing Communities: What Works? Crime and 
Justice: A Review of Research, 8.   
















  116 
C h a p t e r  F i v e -  W o r k s  C i t e d  
Prox, Ryan (2003) Citywide Enforcement Team Statistical 
















  117 
A p p e n d i x  A
Downtown Eastside: The area in Vancouver bordered by Hamilton Street to the West, Powell Street to the 
North, Campbell Street to the East and Pender Street to the South.   
Public Disorder: Includes all fights, assaults, breaches of the peace (Br/Peace), mischief and disturbances 
which occur in all public places or in a licensed premise.   
Fight: Where two or more persons engage in a physical confrontation. 
 
Assault: Where a person physically touches, hits, kicks or spits on another person. 
 
Assault on a Police Officer: Where a person touches, hits, kicks, spits on a police officer in the execution 
of his or her duties. To also resist arrest by a police officer. 
 
Breach of the Peace (Br/Peace): Any incident where people are gathered or acting in a manner which 
causes concern due to their rowdiness, state of intoxication, or loud or obscene use of language or 
behaviour. 
Mischief: Where a person damages property. 
 
Disturbance: Any time that a person’s actions disturbs the ability of others to use the area. 
 
Drug Use: Any time a person is observed using an illegal substance such as marijuana, cocaine, or heroin. 
 
Drug Approach: Any time a person is offered the use of or the ability to purchase an illegal drug or 
substance. 
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A p p e n d i x  B  
Student One First Walk Interview Comments 
 
• The first thing that happened I saw two people screaming across the street 
from each other.  They were screaming and saying fuck off to each other. 
• Two or three guys on the right side of the street, and one of the guys 
approached me in a manner to try and grab me. 
• I went too far and it became apparent the difference because there was an 
older lady smiling at me, clean people, shops.  I knew I went too far. 
• I saw a guy urinating in an open lot against a building. 
• No one tried to sell me drugs on the north side. 
• Coming down the other side I saw more people, my heart was racing. 
• I saw a man with a needle holding like he was trying to get it ready to use. 
• There was another guy asking for a pipe. 
• Three people asked me if I wanted to buy drugs.  They were all women. 
• One asked if I wanted to buy some “white rock.” 
• There was about 4 or 5 people drinking out of bottles. 
• I saw another guy trying to push something through the pipe. 
• I saw another guy had something that looked like a meat poker in his hand. 
• There was a really big crowd of people (about 30 to 40) where two of the 
women offered to sell me rock. 
• I didn’t feel safe in the area. 
• There was so many people that I am not sure they could tell you what planet 
they were on. 
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A p p e n d i x  C  
Interview Results from Student Two- First Walk Along 
• I was really intimidated by two girls a little younger than me, they were 
watching me and I was scared by them. 
• I saw a person lifting their shirt and lighting something under their shirt. 
• I saw several people tweaking, checking the ground. 
• I saw several people scrunching down and facing the other way doing drugs. 
• I saw some people with a plastic pipe doing drugs. 
• I saw some regular-looking couples. 
• Someone said something to me in Spanish. 
• Someone offered me “Up.” 
• I heard someone else say, “The price of up these days is way out of here.” 
• I saw three guys dancing around weird like they were half falling down and 
half dancing. 
• As I got closer to the police station it seemed calmer. 
• I saw lots of people doing drugs. 
• I was scared because of the number of people doing drugs. 
• I saw one girl behind a dumpster doing drugs. 
• The girls are very intimidating. 
• At a crosswalk where three regular-looking guys and these two guys came up 
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A p p e n d i x  D  
Interview Results from Student Three- First Walk Along 
• I started on the north side of the street, I saw two exchanges of hands. Three 
to four “tweakers” on that side of the street. 
• I saw a guy come out of the bar yelling and swearing at another guy. 
• On the way back I saw two people in a group of four exchanging something. 
• When I got into the big crowd people started to whistle.  I saw three four or 
five people doing that dance. 
• I saw a guy with a crack pipe. 
• I saw a guy asking if anyone wanted to buy a pipe.  I saw two or three 
Hispanic male approach a pickup, saw the Hispanic stick his hand in and 
then the truck left. 
• I was then up to Main Street. 
• I saw a lot of people drunk coming out of the bars, using foul language, strong 
smell of urine on the street. 
• My general impression of uncleanliness. 
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A p p e n d i x  E  
Interview Results from Student  Four- First Walk Along 
 
• The north side was quite a bit different from the south side. 
• I saw three or four people smoking a joint. 
• One guys asked me if I wanted to smoke valium. 
• Some people appeared to be drunk or stoned. 
• The further I walked down the road the less it seemed to be crazy. 
• I saw a black guy approaching a guy and appear to make a deal. 
• I saw huge groups of people, easily 25 to 30 people all congregated. 
• Going through there was like a shopping mall.  There were several offers to 
purchase within this group. 
• I saw two people in the alley. 
• I saw another large group of people, smelled lots of pot. 
• More offers to purchase valium. 
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A p p e n d i x  F  
Interview Results from Student  Five- First Walk Along 
• It was pretty quiet. 
• There was people congregating together. 
• People selling stuff on the sidewalk (not drugs). 
• Garbage and urine everywhere. 
• I was approached three times by people to purchase drugs. 
• I saw a guy carrying a TV around. 
• I saw lots of people using drugs. 
• I saw three drug transactions. 
• I was walking down the south side and there were about 7 people there.  I 
saw a prisoner wagon and three police cars and 10 officers standing around 
and the crowd was thinned out and dispersed. 
• When I came back the police were gone and the crowd was forming again. 
• A police car then did a traffic stop. 
• I saw a few people sitting at the Carnegie Centre. 
• When the police were there people all left. 
• It seemed quiet from when I have been down there before I think it because 
the police were there. 





  123 
A p p e n d i x  G  
Interview Results from Student  Five- Second Walk Along 
• I first started outside beside the Main Hastings a guy was yelling out if anyone 
wanted to buy smokes, a motorcycle officer had pulled him over within a 
minute and began to write him a ticket. 
• I saw at the Four Corners Savings I saw four people sleeping.   
• A guy in a wheelchair almost got hit by a car and he began to yell obscenities. 
• I saw some officers detaining three males, two of the males were in 
handcuffs. 
• I saw some guys selling some stuff on the sidewalk.  I saw that they had 
some marijuana they were dumping into a baggie. 
• A Spanish guy walked up to me and asked me if I wanted to buy some rock. 
• I saw quite a few police officers, I saw 6 or 7 officers on the Main Street. 
• I did see about 30 people hanging around in Pigeon Park.   
• The street seemed a lot less crazy this time than last.  There was way less 
people just hanging around.  There were not the mobs of people that I had to 
walk through. 
• There seemed to be a lot less Hispanic guys. 
• There was about 12 people outside Carnegie.  One guy was yelling and he 
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A p p e n d i x  H  
Interview Results from Student  Two- Second Walk Along 
• It was actually a pleasant walk, it looked cleaner, I wasn’t intimidated. 
• I saw tons of police officers, almost two at each corner. 
• I walked by a pub and a police officer was dealing with a woman who was 
crying. 
• I noticed lots of police cars. 
• Police officers talking to normal looking people. 
• It was nice. 
• A guy said to me do you want to buy something. 
• One person actually said hello and was that very nice. 
• A girl was sitting in front of a pizza joint sweared at me when I looked at her, 
then I remembered we were not to look directly at people, I clicked that. 
• It just looked much cleaner. 
• There was not as many groups of people. 
• I saw one girl who looked really sick was yelling where is everybody. 
• I was offered drugs once, I did not see anyone doing drugs, I did see people 
giving others what appeared to be drugs, I am not sure if it was drug use but 
it was not visible like last time. 
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A p p e n d i x  I  
Interview Results from Student  One- Second Walk Along 
• There seemed to be nobody on the street. 
• It was a completely different street. 
• Nobody talked to me, nobody approached me.  I tried to walk as slow as I 
could. 
• There was so much more room to walk, the streets were so crowed last time.  
I wasn’t worried about bumping into anybody this time. 
• I saw a girl wigging out, she appeared to be trying to chew her lips off. 
• I was way more relaxed, there was so many police. 
• On the street I saw way more police.  The last time I think I only saw one car.  
This time I saw at least 8 to ten on foot.  At one corner there was four officers. 
• Last time I was afraid around that big crowd this time there were no groups 
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A p p e n d i x  J  
Interview Results from Student  Four- Second Walk Along 
• A prostitute approached me and asked me if I wanted to use her cell phone, 
and then she asked me if there was anything else she could do for me. 
• There were five Aboriginal ladies in a lane drinking beer. 
• I saw drinking which I did not see last time. 
• I saw a lady in a wheelchair getting helped across the street by another guy. 
• I saw police horses.  
• I was at Abbott Street, I saw five black guys and I saw two officers across the 
street, when the officers started to approach them they all split up and went in 
different directions. 
• I saw another guy and a girl walk up the street and meet two other guys.  
They passed something and then split up. 
• There were some tweakers out as well. 
• I saw one lady shooting up in Pigeon Park. 
• The crowds were definitely not like last time, not even close, not even close. 
• People on the street seemed to be more aware and on edge. 
• I felt a lot safer, partially because it was daylight and also because of the 
number of cops, they seemed to be everywhere. 
• There was another guy on drugs on the sidewalk trying to get up. 
• It seemed to be a lot more alcohol this time, but that might be because I was 
just able to see more because the crowd were so much smaller. 
• The street seemed regular, even the people who seemed drunk did not really 
cause a stink. 
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A p p e n d i x  K  
Interview Results from Student Three- Second Walk Along 
• There were a lot less people.  A lot less street people. 
• I did notice that there were actual normal people out. 
• I actually saw some joggers going down the street. 
• There wasn’t the over powering smell of urine this time. 
• Still some garbage and broken windows. 
• The police presence there were police everywhere you looked, in the alleys, 
up the streets. 
• Lots of the officers were talking to the street people. 
• I saw less activity, last time there were more vehicles pulling up to the people 
on the street and then buying and driving away.  I did not see any of this this 
time. There were couples walking around not like last time.  
• I was not approached for drugs. 
• I saw one drug transaction. 
• I saw another guy holding a needle in his hand. 
• There was another guy starting to get ready in a stairwell. 
• Two people that were tweakers. 
• I felt a lot more comfortable, last time the big groups of people were scary.  
This time there was nothing bigger than five people and I did not have any 
concerns for my safety. 
• I saw lots of police cars parked, and cops on foot and motorcycles. 
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A p p e n d i x  L  
Student One Comparison Comments 
First Walk Second Walk 
• Two or three guys on the right side of 
the street, and one of the guys 
approached me in a manner to try 
and grab me. 
• I didn’t feel safe in the area. 
 
• There seemed to be nobody on the street 
• It was a completely different street 
• Nobody talked to me, nobody approached me.  I 
tried to walk as slow as I could 
• There was so much more room to walk, the streets 
were so crowed last time.  I wasn’t worried about 
bumping into anybody this time. 
• I was way more relaxed; there was so many police. 
• On the street I saw way more police.  The last time I 
think I only saw one car.  This time I saw at least 8 
to ten on foot.  At one corner there was four 
officers. 
• Last time I was afraid around that big crowd this 






Student Two Comparison Comments  
First Walk Second Walk 
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• I was really intimidated by two girls a 
littler younger than me, they were 
watching me and I was scared by 
them. 
• I saw lots of people doing drugs 
• I was scared because of the number 
of people doing drugs 
• I saw one girl behind a dumpster 
doing drugs 
• The girls are very intimidating 
• At a crosswalk where three regular 
looking guys and these two guys 
came up beside me and I thought 
something was going to happen. 
 
 
• It was actually a pleasant walk, it looked cleaner, I 
wasn’t intimidated 
• I saw tons of police officers, almost two at each 
corner 
• I noticed lots of police cars 
• Police officers talking to normal looking people 
• It was nice 
• It just looked much cleaner 
• There was not as many groups of people 
• I was offered drugs once, I did not see anyone 
doing drugs, I did see people giving others what 
appeared to be drugs, I am not sure if it was drug 
use but it was not visible like last time 
 
 
Student Three Comparison Comments 
First Walk Second Walk 
• I started on the north side 
of the street, I saw two 
exchanges of hands.   
• Three to four “tweekers” 
on that side of the street 
• I saw a guy come out of 
• There were a lot less people.  A lot less street people 
• I did notice that there were actual normal people out. 
• I actually saw some joggers going down the street 
• The police presence there were police everywhere 
you looked, in the alleys, up the streets. 
• Lot of the officers were talking to the street people. 
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the bar yelling and 
swearing at another guy 
• On the way back I saw 
two people in a group of 
four exchanging 
something. 
• When I got into the big 
crowd people started to 
whistle 
• I saw three four or five 
people doing that dance 
• I saw a guy with a crack 
pipe 
 
• I saw less activity, last time there were more vehicles 
pulling up to the people on the street and then buying 
and driving away.  I did not see any of this time. 
• There were couples walking around not like last time. 
 
• I was not approached for drugs 
 
 
• I felt a lot more comfortable, last time the big groups of 
people were scary.  This time there was nothing 
bigger than five people and I did not have any 
concerns for my safety. 




Student Four Comparison Comments 
First Walk Second Walk 
• The further I walked down the road 
the less it seemed to be crazy. 
• I saw a black guy approaching a guy 
and appear to make a deal 
• I saw huge groups of people easily 25 
to 30 people all congregated. 
• There were five Aboriginal ladies in a lane drinking 
beer 
• I saw drinking which I did not see last time. 
• The crowds were definitely not like last time, not 
even close, not even close. 
• People on the street seemed to be more aware and 
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• Going through there was like a 
shopping mall.  There were several 
offers to purchase within this group 
• It was hard to catch everything that 
was going on because there was so 
much 
on edge. 
• I felt a lot safer, partially because it was daylight 
and also because of the number of cops, they 
seemed to be everywhere. 
• It seemed to be a lot more alcohol this time, but 
that might be because I was just able to see more 
because the crowd were so much smaller. 
• The street seemed regular, even the people who 
seemed drunk did not really cause a stink 
 
Student Five Comparison Comments 
First Walk Second Walk 
• It was pretty quiet 
• There was people congregating together 
• People selling stuff on the sidewalk (not drugs) 
• Garbage and urine everywhere 
• I was approached three times by people to 
purchase drugs 
 
• I saw lots of people using drugs 
• I saw three drug transactions 
• I was walking down the south side and there 
were about 7 people there.  I saw a prisoner 
wagon and three police cars and 10 officers 
standing around and the crowd was thinned out 
and dispersed. 
• I first started outside beside the Main 
Hastings a guy was yelling out if anyone 
wanted to buy smokes, a motorcycle 
officer had pulled him over within a 
minute and began to write him a ticket 
• I saw at the 4 corners Savings I saw four 
people sleeping 
• I saw quite a few police officers, I saw 6 
or 7 officers on the Main Street. 
 
• I did see about 30 people hanging around 
in Pigeon Park 
• The street seemed a lot less crazy this 
time than last.  There was way less 
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• When I came back the police were gone and 
the crowd was forming again. 
• When the police were there people all left. 
• It seemed quiet from when I have been down 
there before I think it because the police were 
there. 
 
people just hanging around.  There were 
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